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The Washington Redskins Case and
The Doctrine of Disparagement:
How Politically Correct
Must a Trademark Be?
Kimberly A. Pace*
I. INTRODUCTION
'Welcome to today's game between the Baltimore Blackskins and the San Fran-
cisco Yellowmen .... And here come the Yellowmen onto the field, led by their
famous cheerleaders, the Geisha Girls .... Before today's kickoff, we want to
remind you that plenty of good seats still are available for next week's game
against the New Jersey Fighting Jews. The Jews will be bringing their hilarious
mascot, the Famous Rabbi, who will be performing during the game and at
halftime .... ' Ask yourself this question: If your skin color, race or religion were
parodied in nicknames or mascots or team logos, wouldn't you be offended?'
Although names such as the "New Jersey Fighting Jews" or the "New
York Negroes" might seem unrealistic in contemporary society, there are
ethnic groups still held out for public ridicule as team mascots. Why
would it be socially repugnant to name a team the "New York Negroes"
but not to name one the "Cleveland Indians?" Worse yet, could there be a
team named the "New York Niggers?" Isn't that just the racial equivalent
of the "Washington Redskins?"
This Article concentrates on the use of Native American images as
team mascots and trademarks. It will detail the protests by Native Ameri-
cans concerning the manner in which these trademarks perpetuate de-
grading racial stereotypes. It will also analyze the merit of the Petition to
* Associate, Kirkland & Ellis; J.D. 1994, Georgetown University Law Center, M.S.,
1994, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; B.S.E.E., 1990, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. In 1995, the author will serve as judicial clerk to the Honorable Glenn L
Archer, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
1. Steve Kelley, Several Nicknames Invite Changes, Not Cheers, SEArLE TIMES,
Feb. 21, 1992, at El.
Cancel the "Washington Redskins" trademark under section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act.
Part II of this Article addresses the use of race in trademarks. In par-
ticular, it details the opposition of Native Americans to the exploitation
of their culture and imagery in a disparaging manner, which perpetuates
racially demeaning stereotypes. Part III discusses the protections avail-
able for trademarks and the advantages of federal registration. It also
gives a general overview of the federal registration process and the
means available to a third party to contest a trademark's registration.
Part IV discusses the content-based restrictions on trademark registration
found in Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act and the case law interpreting
this provision. It also argues that the dearth of case law discussing Sec-
tion 2(a)'s prohibition against the registration of disparaging trademarks
has failed to yield an appropriate test to determine when a mark is ra-
cially disparaging. While this article does propose a test for racial dis-
paragement, it also argues that the Lanham Act's content-based restric-
tions that deny registration to immoral, scandalous and disparaging
trademarks are an unconstitutional violation of the trademark owner's
First Amendment rights. Finally, Part V details the Petition to Cancel the
Redskins trademark and the legal arguments that have been raised.
II. TRADEMARKS AND RACE
A. Use of Race in Trademarks
In our not-too-distant past, grotesque racial caricatures and stereotypes were ac-
cepted in America as an ordinary form of humor. Advertisements and packages
showed black Americans with thick, saucer lips and eyes wide with fear, or Asian
Americans with long braids, swallowing live rats. The 'humorous' depictions clear-
ly had a cutting edge, and their profusion served to reinforce white notions of
racial superiority. Even less grotesque representations of blacks as servants or
cooks had the same effect, driving home the concept that blacks were suited for
menial jobs.'
At present, there is no registered trademark that contains the racial
epithet "nigger." However, this was not true in this country's recent past;
companies used trademarks such as "Nigger Head Brand" for canned
vegetables3 and "Niggerhair Tobacco."4 While these trademarks were
acceptable in the early part of the twentieth century, an era politically
2. HAL MORGAN, SYMBOLS OF AMERICA 52 (1986); see Appendix A for examples of
federally registered trademarks that used African-American imagery.
3. See Appendix A.
4. The "Niggerhair Tobacco" trademark was accompanied by a caricature of a
black woman with a bushy Afro and rings through her nose. See Nancy Kruh, Collect-
ing Controversy; Evolving Images: Aunt Jemima, Uncle Ben, and The Chef of Cream
of Wheat, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 13, 1994, at IF.
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and economically dominated by white men, they are certainly not ac-
ceptable in our multi-cultural society. It is not surprising that these ra-
cially offensive trademarks are not found in contemporary society. Sec-
tion 2(a) of the Lanham Act prevents the registration of a trademark with
such words as "nigger," because it would ridicule African-American peo-
ple and depict them in a disparaging way.!
Although the denial of federal registration does not prevent companies
from using disparaging trademarks,' many companies do not use marks
that would be racially offensive to African-Americans. It would be eco-
nomically unwise for a company to use a trademark that is offensive to
African-Americans. A company's trademark is its commercial identity. If
a company's symbol is offensive, those who are offended will not buy the
company's product. For this reason companies are constantly changing
their trademarks to appeal to consumers.7 "Few trademarks, logos and
corporate symbols are constant .... [Tihey are fluid creatures that
evolve with society."8
Perhaps the single best example of the evolution of a trademark is
found in the "Aunt Jemima" trademark owned by the Quaker Oats Com-
pany. "Aunt Jemima has undergone several makeovers since her incep-
tion .... The trademark for the nation's first pancake mix has gone from
a hideous caricature of slave-like servitude to a symbol of home cooking
prepared with a smile."9 When Quaker Oats first used Aunt Jemima as a
trademark for pancake mix in 1893, she appeared as caricature of a
black "mammy" grinning with a handkerchief over her head." It wasn't
until 1917 that the company replaced the caricature with a drawing of a
real person, but even then, "Aunt Jemima" retained a "smiling stereotype
of a household helper."" Over the years the Quaker Oats Company em-
ployed a number of different women to make public appearances as
Aunt Jemima to promote the brand name and reinforce her image.2
5. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1988).
6. See infra notes 72-88 and accompanying text.
7. Sandra Clark & Paul Shepard, Trademark Makeovers Aim to Keep Image Hip,
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Mar. 7, 1993, at El.
8. Id.
9. Id. The "Aunt Jemima" trademark has undergone seven makeovers since its
inception. Janet Key, At Age 100, a New Aunt Jemima, CH. TRIB., Apr. 28, 1989, at
Cl; see Appendix B.
10. See MORGAN, supra note 2, at 55.
11. Id.
12. See Kruh, supra note 4, at IF. The first woman employed to portray "Aunt
Jemima" was Nancy Green, a black cook from Kentucky; see also MORGAN, supra
"Though Quaker Oats long ago stopped hiring women to pose as Aunt
Jemima, the image has undergone a continued metamorphosis to reflect
changing social mores."'3 In 1968, in response to complaints that "Aunt
Jemima" was a racist trademark and that she depicted blacks in a de-
grading fashion, the Quaker Oats Company gave "Aunt Jemima" a face
lift.'4 "Aunt Jemima" lost weight, and the red knotted handkerchief she
wore over her head became a more modem-looking headband (a red
bandanna).'" These changes were made in an attempt to shed the black
mammy image and avoid racial stereotypes.'" In 1989, "Aunt Jemima"
received another makeover. This time, the Quaker Oats Company re-
moved her red bandanna, gave her a modem hair style, added gray to
her hair, white pearl earrings and a lace collared blouse. 7 Quaker Oats
admitted to making the changes in "Aunt Jemima"'s appearance after
conducting research which showed that consumers viewed the bandanna
as a "symbol of slavery.""
The Quaker Oats Company has been diligent in assuring that their
trademark conforms with contemporary societal views of acceptability. '"
Quaker Oats is sensitive to societal views because they do not want to
jeopardize the value of their "Aunt Jemima" trademark, which they esti-
mate to be worth approximately three million dollars.' Since her last
makeover only cost the company $100,000, it is certainly in Quaker Oats'
economic interest to update the "Aunt Jemima" image to avoid offending
or alienating consumers."
note 2, at 55.
13. Kruh, supra note 4, at IF.
14. See Clark & Shepard, supra note 7, at 1E.
15. Id.
16. See Carolyn Abraham, Not-so-visible Minorities; Local Advertisers are Reluctant
to Tie Their Images to Non-White Models, OTrOWA CITIZEN, Nov. 9, 1992, at Al.
17. See Kruh, supra note 4, at IF; Appendix B.
18. Fred Brown Jr., Collecting African-American Images, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1990,
at C5. Quaker Oats is not the only company concerned with offending African-Ameri-
cans. In 1993, Nabisco undertook research to determine if their Cream of Wheat Chef
trademark, used for over 100 years, was offensive to blacks. After conducting a sur-
vey that targeted African-Americans, the company concluded that the trademark was
not offensive. See Kruh, supra note 4, at IF.
19. "The change in Aunt Jemima, now a century old, parallels a similar effort by
advertisers and marketers to give Betty Crocker a more modern persona .... Betty
Crocker, the 65-year-old trademark ... has undergone six makeovers." Key, supra
note 9, at C1.
20. Id.
21. See Clark & Shepard, supra note 7, at 1E.
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B. Use of Native Americans as Trademarks
During a radio talk show I was on, at the time of the Atlanta Braves brouhaha, a
lady name Diane called to say she had attended a high school with a team nick-
named 'Indians.' She said she was proud to paint her face, stick feathers in her
hair and make Hollywood war whoops as part of her cheerleading duties. 'I felt
we were honoring the Indian people,' she said. Suppose your team was called the
'African Americans,' I asked her. Would you paint your face black, wear an afro
wig and prance around the football field trying to imitate your perceptions of
black people? She responded, 'Of course not! That would be insulting to blacks.'
My point is made, I responded.'
1. Use of Native American Imagery in Conjunction with Athletic
Teams
Native Americans oppose the use of American Indians as team logos,
trademarks and mascots.' They claim that the marks depict Indians in a
racist and degrading fashion, and that they perpetuate demeaning stereo-
types. Many professional sports teams, as well as a number of college
and high school teams, use Indians as their mascots. Such marks include:
the Washington Redskins; the Kansas City Chiefs; the Cleveland Indians
and their mascot, "Chief Wahoo"; the Atlanta Braves and their mascot,
"Chief Noc-A-Homa"; the Chicago Blackhawks; the Florida State Univer-
sity Seminoles; the University of Illinois Fighting Illini; the University of
Miami (Ohio) Redskins; and the St. John University Redmen. 4
Indian groups opposing the use of these names have tried a number of
legal and non-legal means to persuade teams to stop using racially offen-
sive mascots. They have proposed boycotts on teams and universities
that continue to use offensive marks, held protests and demonstrations,
pressed reporters to identify these teams only by their city or school,
introduced legislation that would force teams to stop using offensive
names and filed lawsuits. Their efforts have been moderately successful.
22. 138 CONG. REC. E152-53 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992) (statement of Hon. Eni F. H.
Faleomavaega of American Samoa).
23. Native American groups that have been at the forefront of the protests include:
the Morning Star Institute, the National Indian Education Association, American Indian
Movement (AIM) and the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI).
24. See Appendix C for the design marks that accompany a number of these word
marks. As mentioned, this list is not exclusive. In Washington state alone there are
approximately 31 schools that use Indian related nicknames and mascots. See Edito-
rial, Be Sensitive, But Don't Drop AU Indian Names, SEATrLE TIMES, Sept. 28, 1993,
at B4.
Some newspapers, like The Oregonian, in Portland, refrain from pub-
lishing nicknames that refer to Indians. 5 Some high school and college
teams have stopped using Native American imagery after complaints that
the marks were offensive." For example, in 1972, Stanford University
changed it team mascot from the Indians to the Cardinal after protests
that the name was racist. 7 The same year, the University of Massachu-
setts replaced its team mascot, an Indian, with a Minuteman.' Eastern
Michigan, Syracuse and Dartmouth have also abandoned their Indian-
related nicknames and mascots.' Finally, the Boards of Education of
both Minnesota and Wisconsin have adopted a ban on all Indian mascots
in public schools.' Unfortunately, no professional sports team has
changed its name in response to the efforts of Native American groups.3
2. The Washington Redskins-The Worst Offender
Native American Indian groups have long been claiming that the
Washington Redskins' trademark is particularly racist and degrading.
They insist that the term "Redskin" is a racial epithet, and as such, it
perpetuates demeaning stereotypes of Native Americans.'
25. See Kelley, supra note 1, at El.
26. Keith Ervin, Debate on Dropping School Mascots, SEATrLE TIMES, Sept. 22,
1993, at B1. Native Americans are not the only racial group that has successfully
opposed being used as a mascot. The Shoreline Community College in Seattle
changed their mascot from a Samurai to a Dolphin after protests that the Samurai
was racist. Id.
27. David Arnold, Minutemen Comes Under '90s-Style Fire, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct.
14, 1993, at 1.
28. Id. The Minuteman, likewise, has come under attack by students as a sexist,
racist, militaristic mark. However, UMass has refused to change its current mascot in
response to these recent protests. Id. Hal Morgan, author of SYMBOLS OF AMERICA,
suggested that "UMass adopt the tomato as a mascot. Plants are safe. They don't
offend anyone. Then again, imagine being a quarterback and getting sacked for the
UMass Tomatoes." Id. "Even symbols seemingly safer than the besieged Minuteman
have come under fire. The Hurricanes of the University of Miami thought they had
no issue with their football nickname until Hurricane Andrew devastated southern
Florida last year. After that, the school received complaints about the team moniker."
Id.
29. See Karen Goldberg, Ethnic Team Names Draw New Attacks, WASH. TIMES,
July 10, 1993, at D1; Suzanne Fields, Will Snub Patrol Scalp Braves, 'Skins, Indians?,
ATL. J. & CONST., Aug. 30, 1993, at A8.
30. See Ervin, supra note 26, at B1.
31. However, there has been some progress with professional sports teams. After
15 years, Chief Noc-A-Homa no longer emerges from his tepee behind the left field
wall to do a war dance after every home run hit by the Atlanta Braves. See Clark &
Shepard, supra note 7, at 1E.
32. Many commentators agree that the use of racial slurs, insults, and epithets is
damaging to society as a whole, and particularly damaging to the minority group
being singled out. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for
[Vol. 22: 7, 19941 How Politically Correct Must a Trademark Be?
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
[The Washington Redskins are] the only big time professional sports team whose
name is an unequivocal racial slur .... After all, how would we react if the team
was named the Washington Negroes? Or the Washington Jews? And, what's
worse, the name of Washington's team-unlike the Cleveland Indians, the Atlanta
Braves, the Chicago Blackhawks (named for an actual chief) or the Kansas City
Chiefs-is more than a mere racial reference. It is an actual racial epithet.'
The team's trademark consists of the words, "Washington Redskins,"
along with a picture of an Indian.' The team federally registered the
"Redskins" trademark in 19 6 7 ,' though the team actually began using
the name "Redskins" in 1933, in Boston, Massachusetts.
Initially, Native Americans attempted to persuade the Washington
Redskins' owner, Jack Kent Cook, to change the team's logo through
non-legal means. These efforts included protests, demonstrations, boy-
cotts and writing personal letters stating that the name is offensive. At
one protest, Native Americans handed the fans redskin potatoes as they
entered a Redskins' game, suggesting that if the team won't change their
name altogether, they should at least change their mascot to the pota-
to.' Legislation was even proposed in Congress, which would force the
Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV, C.R.-C.L L. REV. 133, 135-39
(1982) (detailing the psychological, sociological, and political harms that result from
racial insults); Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42
RUTGERS L. REV. 287, 302 (1990) (stating that racial epithets reinforce negative ste-
reotypes, prejudices, and feelings of inferiority); Charles R. Lawrence, /f He Hollers
Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 452 ("The
experience of being called 'nigger' . . . is like receiving a slap in the face."); Mari J.
Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 97 MICH.
L. REV. 2320, 2336-38 (1989); Brian Owsley, Racist Speech and "Reasonable People:" A
Proposal For A Tort Remedy, 24 CoLuM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 323, 324 (1993) ("Psycho-
logical, emotional and even physical damage is attributed to racist speech ....
Along with the emotional harm, racists' speech can affect the victim's dignity...
[and] facilitates the spread of racial prejudice."); Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado, A
Shifting Balance: Freedom of Expression and Hate-Speech Restriction, 78 IOWA L
REV. 737, 746 (1993) (pointing out that "hate speech" has a pernicious effect on the
self-respect of minority groups).
33. Clarence Page, Block that Trademarked Racial Epithet, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Sept. 23, 1992, at A9.
34. See Appendix C.
35. See Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828, 1828 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
36. See Roy Walter, No Spud Missiles for Them, COURIER J., Dec. 6, 1993, at 2D;
Jack Ripley, American Indians Protest NFL's Redskins, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec.
6, 1993, at 3B; see also Gallery, Keep, Name, Move the Team to Idaho, SAN DIEGO
UNION TaIB., Dec. 6, 1993, at D2. This author has found a proposed fight song for
the Redskins, should they change their mascot to the Spuds, entitled, Hail to the
Redskins, French Fried or Mashed. The lyrics to the fight song are: "Hail to the Red-
13
Washington Redskins to change their name if they wished to continue to
play on a federally funded field.37 The bill, the District of Columbia Sta-
dium Act of 1957 Amendments of 1993, was introduced by Senator Ben
Nighthorse Campbell.' It authorized the construction, maintenance and
operation of a new stadium for the Redskins, with federal funds.' The
Stadium Act also contained a provision which prohibited the use of the
federally funded stadium by teams with nicknames and trademarks "ex-
ploiting any racial or ethnic group."'
In addition to the congressional legislation, a majority of the District of
Columbia City Council passed a resolution requesting the Washington
Redskins to change its name."2 However, all attempts to persuade the
skins, Hail Victory! Potato in your Fork Bath, Fight on for Old D.C.! Bake 'em, Fry
'em, Skin 'em, Slice 'em, Mash 'em, and Smash 'em, Pound through the Line. Fight
on, Fight on, for Old D.C.!!" Asian Baghdadi, Associate, Kirkland & Ellis, in
Washington D.C. (Apr. 26, 1994) (quoting Jonathan Baghdadi). This fight song is far
less offensive than the original version of the Redskins' fight song, with lyrics as
follows: "'Hail to the Redskins, hail victory! Braves on the warpath, fight on for old
D.C.! Scalp 'em, wamp 'em, we will take 'em big score. Read 'em, weep 'em, touch-
down, we want heap more!'" See Hail to the Redskins, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1984, at
N7. Even the present version of the fight song, which was modified in 1970, uses
lyrics like, "Beat 'em, Swamp 'em." Id.
37. See generally S. REP. No. 1207, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The Redskins cur-
rently play at RFK Stadium which is owned by the District of Columbia.
38. See 139 CONG. REC. S8493 (daily ed. July 1, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Nighthorse Campbell). When the bill was introduced, Senator Campbell stated:
As the only American Indian serving in Congress, I am disturbed that individ-
uals, organizations, and groups continue to use terms and slogans that are
disparaging and disrespectful to racial and ethnic groups. Although Native
American people represent one of the smallest population groups, the contri-
butions they have made to this country's rich history have been signifi-
cant . . . . It disturbs me that today, these insensitive terms and slogans
continue to be used freely .... I will tell you that these practices are not
only offensive to Indian people but they also perpetuate the stereotypes that
society has of Indian people.
Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at S8494.
41. A resolution does not have the force of law; in fact, it has no binding effect
at all. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1310 (6th ed. 1990). It cannot force Jack Kent Cook
to change the "Redskins" name, but it is an avenue for the City to express public
disapproval of the name and encourage a change.
42. See LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA REQUEST FOR A NAME
CHANGE OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE (NFL) WASHINGTON D.C. TEAM OF 1992,
PR 9-330 (1992). The resolution found in pertinent part:
(4) The name 'Redskins' is objectionable to many Native Americans and the
use of the world 'Redskins' is racially insensitive in a multi-cultural society.
(5) The continued use of an objectionable name is an offense not only to
Native Americans, but also is a discredit to the many men who have played
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Washington Redskins' owner Jack Kent Cook to cease using the Red-
skins mark have failed. Cook steadfastly denies that the Redskins' name
is offensive, derogatory, disparaging or demeaning to anyone.' Cook
refuses to change the Redskins' name, claiming, "I admire the Redskins
name. I think it stands for bravery, courage and a stalwart spirit, and I
see no reason why we shouldn't continue to use it."' Furthermore, he
contends that the word "Redskin," does not mean, necessarily, generical-
ly Indian. It means something that's much more important. It represents
courage, a braveness.45 Cook, like others, argues that the Indian names
were meant to honor rather .than disparage.
After all other means of persuasion failed, a group of Native Americans
filed a Petition for Cancellation with the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office (PTO) to cancel the federal registration of the Washington
Redskins trademark.4" The petitioners claimed that the term "Redskins"
was at the time of registration, and continues to be, "a pejorative, derog-
atory, degrading, offensive, scandalous, contemptuous, disreputable, dis-
paraging and racist designation for a Native American person."" Jack
Kent Cook is now forced to defend his claim-that the Redskins trade-
mark is not disparaging to Native Americans-if he wishes to maintain
its federal registration. While cancellation of the trademark's federal
registration does not prevent the team from continuing to use the Red-
skins name, it does revoke the benefits afforded by federal registra-
tion.' Canceling federal registration on the basis that the trademark dis-
outstanding football for the team.
(6) Nicknames and mascots constitute an unauthentic representation of Native
Americans, whether used for entertainment, commercial, or symbolic purpos-
es, this imagery degrades Native American people and culture, and distorts
Native American and non-Native American perception of self and community.
Id.
43. See, e.g., Page, supra note 33, at A9; Bill Pensoneau, Letters from Readers,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Sept. 19, 1992, at 14A.
44. Leonard Shapiro, Native American Coalition Files Action on 'Redskins, WASH.
PosT, Sept. 11, 1992, at C1 (quoting Jack Kent Cook).
45. Doug Grow, The Way to Redskins Owner's Heart is Through His Wallet, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis), Sept. 11, 1992, at 3B (quoting Jack Kent Cook).
46. See Petition for Cancellation at 1, Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1828, 1829 (T.T.A.B. 1994). The petitioners have also sought the cancellation of
all related trademarks including: "Redskinettes," "Skins," "Redskins," "The Redskins &
Design," "Washington Redskins & Design," and "The Redskins-Stylized Letters." The
trademarks are owned by a corporation entitled, Pro-Football, Inc. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Shapiro, supra note 44, at Cl.
parages Native Americans could eliminate the team's exclusive right to
use the trademark.4" This would open the doors to others who wish to
profit from the Redskins' name, and Jack Kent Cook would be powerless
to stop them.' Native Americans hope that the loss of federal govern-
ment protection of the trademark will provide a sufficient economic in-
centive to persuade Jack Kent Cook to choose a new team name."1
3. Why Companies Don't Care if They Offend Native Americans
Perhaps Native American protests over the exploitation of Indian imag-
ery in trademarks continue to go unheard because they do not have the
political or economic clout to command an audience. The lack of politi-
cal influence stems from the relatively small size of the Native American
population.
[Native Americans] don't have the numbers. If those nicknames caricatured black
culture, and the blacks objected, they would have been wiped off the rosters of
every American athletic team from the pros to the peewees. But America and the
politicians can afford to tune out the Indians. They have a couple of million peo-
ple in the United States. They can't influence legislation.'
In addition, because Native Americans represent a relatively small
segment of the American population, they don't wield the same consum-
er buying power that has enabled other minorities to force companies to
change trademarks which they find offensive. Trademark owners can
afford to offend and alienate Native Americans because they are not
dependent on them for their economic survival. "One of the basic premis-
es of advertising is that if it is too offensive to too many people, its use
will be counterproductive, for those who are offended will not only re-
fuse to buy the product, but also, if they are sufficiently offended, they
will attempt to persuade others to refuse also."' However, when a truly
discrete and insular minority, such as Native Americans, is the subject of
the disparaging mark, it does not have the economic power to effectuate
a product boycott. For this reason, companies and team owners can
ignore the Native Americans until the courts enforce existing restrictions
on racially disparaging trademarks.
However, on April 29, 1994, President Clinton met with Native Ameri-
can tribal leaders to discuss tribal sovereignty, economic development
49. See Grow, supra note 45, at 3B.
50. See Page, supra note 33, at A9.
51. See Shapiro, supra note 44, at Cl.
52. Jim KIobuchar, There Can Be No Excuse for Ignoring the Pain of Parody,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 22, 1992, at 3B.
53. Sambo's of Ohio v. City Council of Toledo, 466 F. Supp. 177, 180 (N.D. Ohio
1979) (holding that it would violate First Amendment rights to restrict the use of the
term "Sambo's" regardless of how many people are offended).
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and other Indian concerns.r4 An earlier meeting between Native Ameri-
cans leaders and the United States Presidency took place in 1822.' Pres-
ident James Monroe invited American Indian leaders to dinner at the
White House in an effort to ease tensions after the federal government
seized Indian land.' Indicative of the government's insensitivity to Indi-
an customs, upon their arrival at the White House, the Indians were
forced to change out of their "Indian garb" and don military uniforms."
President Clinton, considerably more sensitive to the concerns of Native
American groups, met with 542 tribal leaders to examine the long-term
problems plaguing the Indian people.' The President treated the Indian
leaders with the same level of respect as the head of any foreign govern-
ment. It is hoped this symbolic meeting between the President and the
tribal leaders will result in greater awareness and sensitivity to the con-
cerns of Native Americans, including the use of Indian imagery in trade-
marks.
III. TRADEMARK PROTECTION
"The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psycho-
logical function of symbols .... If it is true that we live by symbols, it is
no less true that we purchase goods by them."' Trademark owners can
acquire protection for their marks from three sources: federal registra-
tion,' state registration,6' or the common law. Unlike the state and fed-
eral protections, which are only accorded after a trademark owner files a
registration, common law rights arise from adoption and use as a trade
identifier; and nothing else need be done to acquire common law
rights.' "At common law, the exclusive right to a [trademark] grows out
54. See Linda Kanamine, Tribal Leaders Now Feel They 'Can Be Heard,' U.S.A.
ToDAY, Apr. 28, 1994, at Al.
55. See Maria Williams, Native American Leaders Going to the White House, SEAT-
TLE TIMES, Apr. 26, 1994, at Al.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Kanamine, supra note 54, at Al.
59. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205
(1942).
60. The Lanham Act provides the current scheme of federal trademark registration.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988).
61. All states have adopted their own trademark statutes and registration scheme.
Most of these statutes are based upon the Model State Trademark Bill.
62. The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). However, mere advertising of a
mark does not constitute a sufficient use to which common law rights will attach.
of its use."' Once a trademark is adopted and used in connection with
goods or services, the common law creates an enforceable right of exclu-
sivity for the mark's owner in the geographic area in which the mark is
used.' This means that the first to use a trademark is the mark's owner
in the area of use, and has the right to exclude all others from using
trademarks that would be confusingly similar.'
Unlike patents and copyrights which are governed exclusively by feder-
al law,' both Congress and state legislatures regulate trademarks. 7
This concurrent authority exists because the Constitution does not ex-
pressly address the power to regulate trademarks. All federal and state
statutory trademark law originally stemmed from the state common law
of unfair competition.' It wasn't until 1946 that Congress passed the
Lanham Act, which provides the current federal registration system for
protecting trademarks used in commerce.' The Lanham Act's expresses
See Western Stove Co. v. Geo. D. Roper Corp., 82 F. Supp 206, 216 (S.D. Cal. 1949);
cf. Avakoff v. Southern Pac. Co., 765 F.2d 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (mere advertising
does not constitute a trademark use for purposes of federal registration.)
63. Id.
64. See Blue Bell Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1975). Since com-
mon law rights attach upon the use of the mark, they can be limited in geographical
scope to the area where the mark is used and in a natural zone of expansion. It is
possible for two different people to own legitimately, and have rights enforceable at
common law, for the same trademark in two different geographic areas. See United
Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918); Hanover Star Milling Co. v.
Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
65. See Modular Cinemas of Am., Inc. v. Mini Cinemas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 578
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
66. The Constitution expressly granted Congress a right to regulate the law of
patents and copyrights. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Supreme Court has held
that this grant of regulatory authority to Congress preempts any state regulation of
subject matter that comes within Congress' power. States cannot protect subject mat-
ter that fails to meet the requirements for federal protection. See Bonito Boats, Inc.
v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155-56 (1989); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S.
225, 231 (1964).
67. The Supreme Court has held that Congress does not have exclusive authority
to regulate trademarks. The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). The Court held
that Article I, § 8, clause 8, which granted the Congress the right to regulate patents
and copyrights, did not extend to trademarks. Id. However, Congress does have the
authority to regulate trademarks that are used in interstate commerce under the Com-
merce Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
68. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2754-55 (1992).
69. "The term 'trademark' includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof ... used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish his or her
goods .. .from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of
the goods, even if that source is unknown." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988). The common
law definition of a trademark is virtually identical to the Lanham Act's definition. See
Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1975).
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its dual purpose to protect both the trademark owner's exclusive right to
benefit from his own goodwill and to protect the public from confu-
sion.'
The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold. One is to protect the
public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular
trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and
wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, time,
and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his invest-
ment from its appropriation by pirates and cheats. This is the well-established rule
of law protecting both the public and the trade-mark owner."
A. The Benefits of Federal Registration
Federal registration of a trademark affords the mark's owner signifi-
cant advantages not available at common law. The Lanham Act expands
common law trademark rights by protecting service marks and collective
marks as well as trademarks.' Federal registration serves as nationwide
constructive notice of a trademark's ownership.' Constructive notice
abrogates any geographic limits on the ownership rights that exist in
common law. Thus, the owner of a federally registered mark can stop
infringements anywhere in the United States.'4 Federal registration also
affords the trademark owner a federal forum to bring any actions in con-
nection with the mark.75 Furthermore, federal registration is prima facie
evidence of ownership and validity of a trademark."6 Additionally, a reg-
istration on the principle register can achieve the status of incontestabil-
70. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988); see also Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Founders' Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 115 F. Supp 787, 791 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
71. S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274.
72. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1053, 1054, 1127 (1988). The Lanham Act also permits submission
of an application before the applicant even uses the trademark as long as he has a
bona fide intent to use the mark. Id. § 1051(b). Whereas trademark rights do not
attach to the mark until after it is actually used, the benefit of the "intent to use"
provision is that upon registration, constructive use is presumed from the date of the
application. Id. § 1057(c)-(d).
73. Id. § 1072. In addition, federal registration serves as constructive nationwide
use from the date of filing for federal registration. Id. § 1057(c).
74. This general rule is subject to an exception. If another person used the trade-
mark before the filing for federal registration in good faith with no actual knowledge
of use by the person filing for federal registration, then the first user can continue to
use the mark, but is limited to the geographic area of his use. Id. § 1115(c)(5).
75. Id. § 1121.
76. Id. § 1057(b).
ity after five years." Incontestability is conclusive evidence of owner-
ship and validity of a mark' and it limits the defenses to an action
brought for trademark infringement." Finally, the owner of a federally
registered trademark has a right to request customs officials to bar the
importation of any goods bearing an infringing trademark.'
B. The Federal Registration Process
To obtain federal registration of a trademark on the principle register,
the mark's owner must file an application with the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO)." The application is reviewed by the examiner ex parte.'
If an examiner refuses to register the mark, an applicant can appeal to
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB).' If the application pass-
es the hurdles of ex parte examination, the mark is published in the
Official Gazette for possible oppositions.' Any person who feels that he
or she would be damaged by registration of the mark may file an oppo-
sition with the PTO.' When an opposition is filed, the TTAB conducts
an inter partes proceeding to decide whether the opposition has merit.'
If the opposition is unsuccessful, or if no opposition is filed, the examin-
77. Id. § 1065.
78. Id.
79. See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985) (holding
that an incontestable mark may not be challenged on the basis of merely being de-
scriptive).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1988).
81. Id. § 1051. If an application does not meet the requirements of registration for
the principle register but is capable of meeting those requirements in the future, the
applicant can seek registration on the Supplemental Register. Id. § 1091. For exam-
ple, a descriptive mark which has not been used long enough to develop the requi-
site secondary meaning necessary for registration on the Principle Register may be
registered on the Supplemental Register. Id. § 1051(a). Unlike the Principle Register,
the Supplemental Register does not provide the registrant with any substantive rights.
However, the Supplemental Register does give the trademark owner access to the
federal courts for infringement claims and it could be a prerequisite for foreign regis-
tration since many countries require some form of registration in the applicants home
country before they will protect a mark abroad. Id. § 1126. Hereinafter, this Article
will limit its analysis to marks on the Principle Register.
82. Id. § 1062(a). An ex parte proceeding is between the applicant and the exam-
iner. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 576 (6th ed. 1990).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 1070 (1988). The TTAB is composed of at least three of the fol-
lowing: the Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner and
members appointed by the Commissioner. Id. § 1067.
84. Id. § 1062(a).
85. See id. § 1063(a). Oppositions must be filed within 30 days of the publication
of the trademark. Id.
86. An inter partes proceeding is between an applicant or registration owner and
any third party. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 817 (6th ed. 1990).
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er will then grant the registration. 7 Once registration is granted, all of
the benefits afforded federal registration attach, including the presump-
tion that the trademark is valid.' Registration is granted for a period of
ten years and is renewable for successive ten year periods.'
While registration does constitute prima facie evidence that the trade-
mark is valid, the mark's validity can still be attacked by any person who
believes that she is damaged by the registration.' If the action is taken
within five years of the mark's registration, a person who believes that
she is damaged by the registration can file a Petition for Cancellation of
the trademark for any of the reasons that the examiner could have re-
fused registration." After five years, a Petition for Cancellation can only
be filed if the registered mark becomes generic, has been abandoned,
was fraudulently obtained, or should not have been granted because the
mark was inconsistent with one of the content-based prohibitions in
subsections 2(a), (b), or (c) of the Lanham Act.' A Petition for Cancel-
lation, like an opposition, is heard by the TTAB. Decisions of the TTAB
can be appealed to either the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit' or to a United States District Court."
IV. SECTION 2(A)-BARS TO REGISTRATION
Although there is a presumption of registrability under the Lanham
Act, federal registration and enforcement of common law rights are not
available for all marks. Section 2 of the Lanham Act contains certain
content-based restrictions to registration which cannot be overcome by
an association with the applicant's goods.' The bars to registration
87. 15 U.S.C. § 1063(b) (1988)
88. Id. § 1057Cb).
89. Id. §§ 1058(a), 1059(a).
90. Id. § 1064.
91. Id.
92. Id. § 1064(3).
93. Id. § 1071. The Federal Circuit was created in 1982 to be a federal court of
appeals of limited jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit is empowered to hear appeals
from the PTO, replacing the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA). In its
first decision, the Federal Circuit adopted all prior decisions of the CCPA. See South
Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b) (1988). An appeal to a district court may be preferable to
some parties because the case is decided de novo. See Summa Corp. v. California ex
rel. State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198, 203 (1984).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1988). Section 2(e) provides that a mark should be refused
registration if it is merely descriptive, primarily geographically descriptive, or primari-
found in subsections 2(a), (b), and (c) are absolute.' According to the
Lanham Act, registration is refused if a mark:
(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, scandalous matter, or matter
which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons living or dead,
Institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disre-
pute.'
Congress determined that marks that fall within these categories should
be prohibited from federal registration for public policy reasons in order
to discourage their use.' The Lanham Act is not the first or the only
ly merely a surname. See id. § 1052(e). However, the applicant can overcome these
restrictions upon a showing of secondary meaning. Id. § 1052(0. Secondary meaning
is proof that the mark has acquired the requisite distinctiveness necessary for trade-
mark protection. See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194
(1984). A mark should also be refused registration if it is likely to be confused with
another trademark. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1988). The purpose inherent in each of these
restrictions is to avoid consumer confusion.
96. Id. § 1052(a)-(c).
97. Id. § 1052(a). Although this article focuses its analysis on the prohibition
against trademarks that are immoral, scandalous or disparaging under Section 2(a),
the Lanham Act also provides that no mark can be registered if it:
(b) Consists of or comprises the flag or coat of arms or other insignia of the
United States, or of any State or municipality, or of any foreign nation, or
any simulation thereof.
(c) Consists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a par-
ticular living individual except by his written consent, or the name, signature,
or portrait of a deceased President of the United States during the life of his
widow.
Id. § 1052(b)-(c).
98. Hearings on 4744 Before the Subcomm. on Trademarks of the House Comm.
on Patents, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1939) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Rep.
Thomas E. Robertson).
Mr. Robertson. Why should the Congress of the United States, for example,
permit Benjamin Harrison's name . . to be used as a trade-mark on any
article, device, or merchandise, even though dead?
Mr. Marony. In other words, we would not want to have Abraham Lincoln
gin.
Mr. Robertson. No, sir, we would not.
Mr. Fenning. Or George Washington coffee.
Mr. Rogers. There was a good deal of discussion last year about that very
thing, and considerable difficulties seem to arise in connection with it which
ever way we jump. I quite agree that Abraham Lincoln gin ought not to be
used, but I would not say the use of G. Washington on coffee should not be
permissible. We attempted to take care of it in subsection (a) of section 2:
'Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter
which tends to disparage persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or na-
tional symbols, or to bring them into contempt.' That would take care of the
abuses, but it would not prevent the perfectly legitimate uses of names.
Id.; see also In re Bush Bros. & Co., 884 F.2d 569, 571 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Thaddeus
Davids Co. v. Davids, 178 F. 801, 805 (2d Cir. 1910) (holding that immoral and scandal-
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prohibition against registration for immoral, scandalous and disparaging
marks. Congress had previously prohibited the federal registration of
such trademarks in the Lanham Act's 1905 predecessor.' In addition, al-
most all state legislatures have prohibited registration for scandalous,
immoral or disparaging trademarks."° International trademark conven-
tions and agreements have also acknowledged that trademarks that fall
into these categories have no place in any registration scheme.'
Like trademarks, scandalous and disparaging design patents are not
entitled to the benefits and protections of patent laws. Patent examiners
ous trademarks should be refused registration for public policy reasons); 1 JEROME
GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, § 3.04[6], at 3-112-14 n.92 (1992) ('The
Lanham Act operates indirectly to protect the public morals by withholding registration
from trademarks which would offend.").
99. Trade-Mark Act of 1905, 15 U.S.C. § 85(a) (1905). It is important to note that
the Lanham Act actually broadened the 1905 provision to include a prohibition on
marks that disparage any person or bring them into contempt or disrepute.
100. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-12-7(a) (1993); ALAsKA STAT. § 45.50.010 (1993); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1442 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-104 (Michie 1993); CAL. Bus
& PROF. CODE § 14200 (West 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-70-108 (1993); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 35-11b (1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 5, § 3303 (1993); FLA. STAT. ch. 495.021
(1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-441 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 48-502 (1993); ILL REV. STAT.
ch. 140, para. 9 (1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-2-1-3 (West 1993); IOWA CODE § 548.2
(1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 81-112 (1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.575 (Baldwin
1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:212 (West 1992); MD. CODE ANN. Bus. REG. § 1-404
(1993); MASS. GEN. L. ch. l10b, § 3 (1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 429.32 (West
1992); MINN. STAT. § 333.19 (1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-25-3 (1993); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 417.001 (1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-303 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-112
(1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.330 (Michie 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-A.2
(1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:3-13.2 (West 1993); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 361 (McKinney
1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 80-2 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-22-02 (1993); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1329.55 (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT. tit. 78, § 22 (1994); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 647.035 (1991); 54 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1111 (1992); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit 10,
§ 194 (1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-2-3 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-15-120 (Law Co-op.
1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 37-6-6 (1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-502 (1993);
TEX. BUS & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.08 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70-3-2 (1993);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2527 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-79 (Michie 1993); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 19.77.020 (West 1993); WYo. STAT. § 40-1-102 (1993).
101. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFrA) has adopted the Lanham
Act's prohibition against scandalous, immoral or disparaging trademarks. North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement, 1993, art. 1708, § 14, 107 Stat. 2123-24. Even as far back
as 1883, countries realized that there were limits to registrability. The Paris Conven-
tion provides that a trademark should not be permitted registration if it is "contrary
to morality or public order and, in particular, of such a nature as to deceive the
public." Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, art.
6B3.
are instructed to reject design patents that consist of material that is
scandalous or offensive to members of any race, religion, sex, ethnic
group or nationality.'" However, copyright protection has been extend-
ed to material that is obscene or scandalous."° Courts have justified the
extension of copyright protection to obscene works on the ground that
society's view of what is moral and immoral continually changes; what
one generation considers obscene, a later generation might consider of
great literary merit.'"
A. Summary of Case Law Decided Under Section 2(a)
"The oft stated maxim that 'each case must be decided on its own facts'
never rings so loudly as it does in Section 2(a) refusals.""°
This section begins by summarizing the existing case law implementing
Section 2(a)'s prohibition against registering scandalous and immoral
marks. It discusses the development of definitions and the factors that
tribunals have considered in reaching findings of immorality or scandal-
ousness. This section also considers the development of a separate test
under Section 2(a) for trademarks that "disparage or bring [people] into
contempt or disrepute."'06
1. Scandalous and Immoral Trademarks
The seminal case for determining whether a trademark is scandalous is
In re Riverbank Canning Co.,"07 decided in 1938. In this case, the exam-
iner found, and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)
agreed, that the mark "Madonna" for wines should be refused because it
was scandalous."° The CCPA held that since the legislative history did
not contain any definition of the term "scandalous," the court should ap-
ply the "ordinary and common meaning" of the word."° The court
102. See Patent & Trademark Office, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1504, at 1500-07 (1989).
103. See Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 858 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).
104. Id. at 857.
105. In re Mavety Media Group Ltd., 1993 TTAB LEXIS 25, *15 (May 5, 1993), va-
cated, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 22772 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 23, 1994).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1988).
107. 95 F.2d 327 (C.C.P.A. 1938). This case was actually brought under the Lanham
Act's 1905 predecessors which prohibited the federal registration of marks that were
scandalous or immoral. To be precise, the very first trademark denied registration as
scandalous was "Queen Mary" for women's undergarments. Ex parte Martha Maid
Mfg., 37 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 156 (1938).
108. Riverbank Canning, 95 F.2d at 329.
109. Id. at 328.
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looked to dictionaries which defined scandalous as "shocking to the
sense of truth, decency, or propriety; disgraceful; offensive; disreputa-
ble... [g]iving offense to the conscience or moral feelings."10 The
court also turned to dictionaries to define the term "Madonna."' Al-
though the court concluded that the word "Madonna" was not per se
scandalous, it was scandalous in light of the goods to which it was ap-
plied-wine."' In 1959, registration was again denied (this time under
the Lanham Act) for the trademark "Madonna" for wines on the grounds
that the term was scandalous."3 The court held that the word
"scandalous" in the Lanham Act has the same meaning as its 1905 prede-
cessor, and, therefore, the cases should be decided under the same anal-
ysis.1
Due to the paucity of legislative history defining the terms "scandal-
ous" and "immoral," courts have cited to the Riverbank Canning deci-
sion that held these terms be given their "ordinary and common mean-
ing.""' To ascertain the framers' intent as to the definition of the terms
"scandalous" and "immoral," courts have turned to the dictionary defini-
tions of the terms extant at-the time of the Lanham Act."6 These courts
have generally adopted the definition of "scandalous" as stated in Riv-
erbank Canning: "Shocking to one's sense of decency or propriety" and
"offensive to the conscience or moral feelings."1 7
110. Id. at 329.
111. Id. at 328.
112. Id. at 329. To determine whether a mark is scandalous, the mark must be
considered in the context of the market place for the goods identified in the applica-
tion for registration. Id.; see also In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 485 (C.C.P.A. 1981);
Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1635, 1639 (T.T.KB. 1988);
In re Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1470, 1471 (T.T.A.B. 1988); In re Thomas Labs,
Inc., 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 50, 52, (T.T.A.B. 1975); Doughboy Indus., Inc. v. Reese
Chem. Co., 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 227,229 (1951) (holding that a trademark is
unregisterable if it is scandalous as applied to the goods on which it will be used;
the mark itself need not be per se scandalous).
113. See In re P.J. Valckenberg, 122 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 334 (T.T.A.B. 1959). For similar
reasons, the TTAB denied registration for the mark "Messias" for wine and brandy
back in 1968. See In re Sociedade Agrocila E. Comercial Dos Vinhos Messias, 159
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 275, 276 (T.T.A.B. 1968).
114. Valckenberg, 122 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 334-35.
115. See, e.g., Greyhound, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1638; In re Tinsletown, Inc., 212
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 863, 865 (T.T.A.B. 1981); see also In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216, 1218 (T.T.A.B. 1993).
116. See, e.g., Greyhound, U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1638; see also McGinley, 660 F.2d at
485-86; Riverbank Canning, 95 F.2d at 328; Old Glory, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
117. See Riverbank Canning, 95 F.2d at 329.
The scandalous and immoral bars to registration have not been limited
to marks that have religious significance. In 1971, the TTAB denied regis-
tration for the mark "Bubby Trap" as applied to brassieres."' The tribu-
nal held that the mark would be offensive to one's sense of propriety or
morality because the term "bubby" is a vulgar reference to a woman's
breast.19
In applying the standards of scandalousness to determine whether a
trademark is registerable, the Board has held that whether a mark is
"shocking to a sense of propriety" is to be determined according to con-
temporary standards of acceptability. 2 ° While a court is bound to the
dictionary definitions existing at the time of the Lanham Act for inter-
preting the terms of the statute, it must refer to contemporary dictionar-
ies to ascertain the definition of the term that the applicant seeks to
register as a trademark.'2 "[Wihat was considered scandalous as a
trademark or service mark twenty, thirty or fifty years ago may no longer
be considered so, given the changes in societal attitudes. Marks once
thought scandalous may now be thought merely humorous (or even
quaint) .... , 2
In 1975, the TTAB reversed the examiner's refusal to register a mark
picturing a "cartoon-like representation of a melancholy, unclothed male
figure ruefully contemplating an unseen portion of his genitalia," for a
device that increases the size of a man's penis." The Board held that
whether a mark is scandalous or immoral must be determined according
to contemporary standards of acceptability.' In this case, the Board
determined that the nakedness of the cartoon mark was not shocking to
118. See In re Runsdorf, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (T.T.A.B. 1971).
119. Id. at 444.
120. See In re Hershey, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1470, 1471 (T.T.A.B. 1988) ("[Tlhe trend
in case law demonstrates a more contemporary attitude toward language and evidenc-
es a more liberal approach to what constitutes scandalous or vulgar language."); In
re Leo Quan Inc., 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 370, 371 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (determining that the
trademark "Badass" [acronym for "Bettncourt Acoustically Designed Audio Sound Sys-
tems"] for use on stringed musical instrument bridges is not scandalous or immoral
according to the "mores of our time"); In re Madsen, 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 334, 335
(T.T.A.B. 1973) (holding that the trademark "Week-End Sex" for a magazine is not
scandalous according to "moral values and conduct fashionable at the moment, rather
than that of past decades"); see also Old Glory, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219.
121. See, e.g., In re Tinsletown, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 863, 866 (T.T.A.B. 1981)
(holding that the court must look to contemporary dictionaries to determine if the
term "Bullshit" should be denied registration); Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471-72
(contemporary dictionaries must be consulted to ascertain the meaning of "pecker").
122. Old Glory, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219 (stating that in light of contemporary
attitudes, use of the mark "Old Glory Condom Corp." with an American flag design
on condoms is not scandalous).
123. In re Thomas Labs, Inc., 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 50, 52 (T.T.A.B. 1975).
124. Id. at 52.
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society's sense of propriety and involved no threat to present day public
morals because contemporary society's attitude toward obscenity has be-
come increasingly liberal."
In In re McGinley, the CCPA upheld the examiner's refusal to register
a photograph of a nude man and woman kissing and embracing in a
manner that exposes the male genitalia because it was scandalous and
immoral. 6 The CCPA held that whether a mark is scandalous or im-
moral "is to be ascertained from the standpoint of not necessarily a ma-
jority, [but] a substantial composite of the general public.' 2 Subse-
quent cases have applied this "substantial composite of the general pub-
lic" standard with approval.'"
In a 1993 decision, the TTAB granted federal registration for the mark
"Old Glory Condom Corp." which pictured a condom decorated with
stars and stripes to resemble an American flag.'" The TTAB has held
that an examiner must determine whether a mark is likely to offend by
considering the entire context of the mark's use."3 In this case, the
125. Id.
126. In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
127. Id. at 485. The McGinley court claimed that this "substantial composite of the
general public" test came from Riverbank Canning. However, this author has been
unable to find such a suggestion in the Riverbank Canning case. See id. at 487
("The majority cites Riverbank in apparent support of using as a basis for decision
the imagined feelings of 'a substantial composite of the general public.' There is no
such expression in Riverbank.") (Rich, J., dissenting). However, subsequent cases
have cited the "substantial composite of the general public" standard with approval.
See infra note 128.
128. See In re Tinsletown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 863, 865 (T.T.A.B. 1981) (holding
that the mark "Bullshit" for accessories is scandalous). The 1TAB rejected applicant's
argument that whether the mark is scandalous should be determined according to the
views of applicant's customers, not the general public. Id; see also Greyhound Corp.
v. Both Worlds Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1635, 1639 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (stating that a
substantial composite of the general public would find a mark which depicts a dog
defecating scandalous); In re Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1470, 1471 (T.T.A.B. 1988)
(holding that the mark "Big Pecker" was not scandalous because the TITAB found
that the evidence was at best marginal that a substantial composite of the general
public would believe that the mark referred to a man's penis instead of a bird's
beak).
129. In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216 (T.T.A.B. 1993).
130. Id. at 1221 (holding that the serious purpose surrounding the use of applicant's
mark is a factor to be taken into account when determining if the mark is offensive
or shocking); see Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471 (reasoning that since the
applicant's mark "Big Pecker" was used in conjunction with a picture of a bird with
a big beak, it was not scandalous).
Board concluded that the mark was not scandalous because its serious
purpose-to prevent the spread of AIDS-was manifest to purchasers on
the package. 3'
2. Disparaging Trademarks
Section 2(a) prohibits the registration of any mark "which may dispar-
age... persons... or bring them into contempt, or disrepute."' In
most cases, when a mark is refused or opposed as disparaging, there is
an accompanying charge that the mark is also scandalous.1" This is
probably due to the dearth of case law addressing the issue of disparag-
ing trademarks."
Doughboy Industries, Inc. v. Reese Chemical Co. was the first case to
refuse registration to a trademark on the grounds that it was disparag-
ing."' The Examiner in Chief of the Patent Office held that the mark
"Dough-Boy" for "a prophylactic preparation for the prevention of vene-
real disease," was disparaging because American soldiers during World
War I were called doughboys."M The examiner found that there was no
doubt as to the word's intended meaning because the package contained
a picture of an American soldier."7 The examiner also held that in de-
termining disparagement, the examiner, should consider the particular
goods to which the mark will be applied."
The next case to discuss disparagement was In re Reemtsma
Cigarettenbabriken.39 In this case, the TTAB refused registration be-
cause the mark "Senussi" for cigarettes, disparaged the religious beliefs
of the Senussi sect whose religion forbids smoking.4 ' The Board stated
131. Old Glory, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1221. However, the T'AB previously held
that, as in the case of registration for trademarks in states or foreign countries, the
applicant's intent in using the mark is irrelevant to a determination of whether the
mark is scandalous. In re Tinsletown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 863, 865-66 (T.T.A.B
1981). The cases discussed in this Article are certainly not an exhaustive list of all
cases brought under § 2(a)'s scandalous or immoral provisions.
132. 15 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (1988). It is important to note that the Lanham Act's 1905
predecessor did not contain a prohibition against disparaging marks. See supra note
99 and accompanying text.
133. See Old Glory, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1221 n.4. However, in this case, the
court held that the test for disparagement and scandalous were the same, expressly
noting that these tests might not always be the sone.
134. See id. at 1221 n.4 ("[Tihere is little precedent on the meaning of 'disparage' in
Section 2(a).").
135. 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 227 (P.T.O. 1951).
136. Id. at 227-28.
137. Id. at 228.
138. Id.
139. 122 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 339 (T.T.A.B. 1959).
140. Id. at 339.
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that "[tihe application of the name of any religious order or sect to a
product whose use is forbidden to the followers or adherents of such
sect or order is an affront to such persons and tends to disparage their
beliefs.""'
In the 1975 case of In re Condas, the TTAB determined that the trade-
mark "Jap" for women's clothing does not disparage Japanese people.
4 2
However, this Article argues that the case has little precedential
value.' In Condas, the TTAB claimed that a New York Supreme Court
case which held that the term "Jap" was not derogatory and did not sub-
ject Japanese people to "contempt, ridicule, or scandal," was persuasive
authority."44 However, the case relied upon by the TrAB, Japanese
American Citizen's League v. Takada, actually held that the petitioners
were not entitled to an injunction because they could not prove econom-
ic injury.42 Petitioners no longer need to prove economic injury to
challenge the registrability of trademark." Furthermore, in Condas, the
TTAB was also persuaded by the applicant's contention that he would
never disparage Japanese people because he himself is Japanese.'47 As
one commentator argued, "[t]his argument is preposterous. If accepted, it
would mean an African American could trademark the word 'nigger' or
an Hispanic American could trademark 'spick.'"'"
141. Id. The use of the product must be forbidden by the group before registration
will be refused. See In re Waughtel, 138 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 594, 594-95 (T.T.A.B. 1963)
(holding that the mark "Amish" for cigars did not disparage the "Amish" people in
the absence of any Amish teachings or rules referring to smoking).
142. 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 544 (T.T.A.B. 1975).
143. Id. at 544; see Japanese-Am. Citizen's League v. Takada, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
109 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971).
144. Condas, 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 544.
145. Takada, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 109 ("The only injury alleged by the petitioners
appears to be injury to petitioners' feelings. Petitioners do not claim that the ....
[u]se of the word or trade name deprived them of a valuable right to the word.").
146. See infra notes 241-45 and accompanying text.
147. Condas, 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 544.
148. Paul E. Loving, Comment, Native American Team Names in Athletics: It's
Time to Trade These Marks, 13 LoY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 1, 26 (1992). Loving's article ar-
gues that professional teams should voluntarily cease using any names or images that
pertain to race. "The present images are contrary to progressive social norms and
practices and their use should be voluntarily discontinued." Id. at 43. He further con-
tends that Native Americans should seek cancellation of disparaging trademarks under
the Lanham Act. Id.
In 1988, the TTAB, established a test for disparagement in Greyhound
Corp. v. Both Worlds Inc.,' which requires:
(1) that the communication reasonably would be understood as referring to the
plaintiff; and (2) that the communication is disparaging, that is, would be consid-
ered offensive or objectionable by a reasonable person of ordinary sensibili-
ties."
In Greyhound, the court held that the applicant's mark depicting a defe-
cating dog disparaged the plaintiffs running dog mark and was, there-
fore, barred from registration.' The TIAB decided that disparagement
was "a violation of one's right of privacy-the right to be 'let alone' from
contempt or ridicule."'52 In formulating its test for disparagement, the
Board adopted the definition of disparagement offered by the Second
Restatement of Torts pursuant to which, "[a] statement is disparaging if
it is understood to cast doubt upon the quality of another's land, chattels
or intangible things ... ."" The Board also relied on a case where the
court adopted the Restatement definition and formulated the above test
for determining whether an advertisement disparages another's prod-
ucts. "' The inherent problem in the Board's reliance on the Re-
statement is that it is inconsistent with the Board's prior decisions that
the terms in the Lanham Act be given their "ordinary and common mean-
ing" at the time of their enactment by searching the terms in dictionaries
extant at the time of the Act.5 ' Congress could not have intended to
adopt the Restatement's definition of disparagement because it was writ-
ten thirty years after the Lanham Act was enacted. Moreover, Section
2(a) of the Lanham Act specifically includes a prohibition against trade-
marks that disparage "persons living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or
national symbols,"" but the Restatement focuses only on the disparage-
ment of property."7 Even if the Board upheld Greyhound's test for dis-
paragement, it should be limited to cases which, like Greyhound, consid-
er whether one trademark disparages another. It would be inappropriate
to apply this test to cases of alleged racial disparagement."
149. 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1635 (T.T.A.B. 1988).
150. Id. at 1639 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 629 (1977)).
151. Id. at 1640. The court also found that a substantial composite of the general
public would find the mark to be scandalous because it was offensive. Id. at 1638.
152. Id. at 1639.
153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 629 (1977).
154. Eagle's Eye, Inc. v. Ambler Fashion Shop, 627 F. Supp. 856, 863 (E.D. Pa.
1985).
155. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
156. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1988).
157. See supra note 153.
158. See iqfra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 22: 7, 19941 How Politically Correct Must a Trademark Be?
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
The next case decided by the TTAB permitted the registration of the
mark "Moonies," where the "oo" portion of the applicant's mark depicted
a caricature of naked buttocks, in connection with dolls "which drop
their pants when a collapsible bulb is squeezed, thus exposing their but-
tocks," despite claims that the mark disparaged members of the Unifica-
tion Church founded by Sun Myung Moon." In this case, the board
agreed with the examiner's contention that the term "Moonies" alone was
not per se disparaging to members of the Unification Church.'" It found
that "Moonies" was an accepted, non-derogatory term describing a mem-
ber of the Unification Church.'"' The examiner, however, agreed that
the caricature of the naked buttocks within the second and third letters
of the applicant's mark was "'lacking in taste'" and "'an affront to an
organized religious sect.'""8 The Board noted that although a dictionary
did not define "Moonies" as members of the Unification Church, other
dictionaries defined the word "moon" as the exposure of one's but-
tocks. " The Board ultimately held that the mark did not disparage
members of the Unification Church because the "Moonies" mark, with its
naked buttocks design, would be perceived by the public as referring to
the fact that the doll "moons" people and would not be perceived as re-
ferring to members of the Unification Church.' However, the Board
noted that,
[blecause the guidelines are somewhat vague and because the determination is so
highly subjective, we are inclined to resolve doubts on the issue of whether a
mark is scandalous or disparaging in favor of [the] applicant and pass the mark
for publication with the knowledge that if a group does find the mark to be scan-
dalous or disparaging, an opposition [or cancellation] proceeding can be brought
and a more complete record can be established.'"
159. See In re In Over Our Heads Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1653-54, 1653 (T.T.A.B.
1990).
160. Id. at 1654. In fact, the mark "Moonies" had already been federally registered
by another applicant for use on clothing. Id.
161. Id. at 1654 n.4. The Board reached this conclusion by finding that the dictio-
nary definitions did not state that "Moonies" is derogatory or disfavored. Id. at 1654.
In addition, the applicant had presented numerous newspaper articles that used the
term "Moonies." From these articles, the Board concluded that the term must not be
derogatory because such major newspapers would never repeatedly use a term which
disparages a particular religious group. Id. at 1654 n.4.
162. Id. at 1654 (citations omitted).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1654-55.
In 1993, the TTAB decided that the mark "Black Tail" for a magazine
which featured pictures of naked Mrican-American women was scandal-
ous because it was "degrading to women" and "offensive to one's sense
of propriety."" The examiner argued, and the court agreed, that the
mark should be refused because the term "Black Tail" "'connotes black
women as... sexual object[s] which would be an affront to women in
general and black women specifically.""67 Although this case would
seem to fit squarely within Section 2(a)'s prohibition against disparaging
marks, the Board instead, decided it under the test for scandalousness,
stating that "[a]lthough we believe that women in general and African-
American women in particular would be especially offended by the mark,
we think that others, including a substantial number of men, likewise
would be offended.""
However, the Federal Circuit later vacated and remanded this case on
grounds that the Board failed to provide concrete evidence that a sub-
stantial composite of the general public would find the mark scandal-
ous. 16
B. The Test for Racial Disparagement
This Article argues that the case law discussing Section 2(a)'s prohibi-
tion against the registration of disparaging trademarks has, thus far,
failed to provide either an appropriate definition of disparagement or a
workable test for determining when a mark is unregisterable because it
could disparage."' Since the legislative history does not reveal
Congress' intent in using the word "disparage," it should be given its
ordinary and common meaning at the time of the Lanham Act's enact-
ment. Dictionaries of that time defined "disparage" as "[t]o speak slightly
of; to undervalue; to discredit,"' 7. and "to dishonor by bringing discredit
or reproach upon ... depreciate, cheapen."'72 According to these defmi-
166. In re Mavety Media Group Ltd., 1993 TTAB LEXIS 25, *15 (May 5, 1993), va-
cated, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 22772 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 23, 1994).
167. Id. at *5 (quoting Examining Attorney's Brief at 4).
168. Id. at *12.
169. Id. at *14.
170. This Article contends that the test enumerated in Greyhound is inappropriate
for cases dealing with disparagement of persons and that this test was developed to
implement a definition of disparagement that Congress could never have intended. See
supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
171. Reply Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Motion to Strike Affirmative
Defenses at 9, Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828 (T.T.A.B. 1994)
(quoting THE NEW COMPREHENSIVE STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
293 (Funk & Wagnalls Co. 1938)).
172. Id. at 9 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW IDEAL DICTIONARY 245 (G. & C. Merriam Co.
1931)).
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tions, Section 2(a) should prohibit the registration of a trademark, which
discredited or degraded any person, institution, belief, or national sym-
bol.
It is important to note from the outset, that the statute clearly distin-
guishes between the test for scandalous and immoral marks, on the one
hand, and disparaging marks on the other. Section 2(a) provides that reg-
istration should be refused when a mark "[c]onsists of or comprises
immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may dispar-
age... persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols,
or bring them into contempt or disrepute."'' The statute does not pro-
hibit "matter which disparages;" rather, it prohibits "matter which may
disparage." The latter is certainly a broader prohibition than the former.
This Article argues that, unlike the test for scandalous matter, which is
limited to an inquiry of whether the matter is scandalous at the time the
applicant is seeking registration, the presence of the world "may" in the
disparagement language expresses Congress' intent that marks that could
or might be disparaging, even if they are not considered so at the time of
the application, should be barred from federal registration.Y If the stat-
ute is interpreted in this manner, petitioners who seek to cancel a mark
on the ground that it disparages would be able to include proof that the
mark has, since its registration, become disparaging. Thus, if a petitioner
could show that the mark has, since its registration, become disparaging,
this would demonstrate the fact that the mark had the potential to be
disparaging from the outset, and therefore, should never have been grant-
ed registration. 5
Tribunals have held that the relevant determination for whether a
mark should be cancelled for disparagement is whether the mark consist-
ed of matter that disparaged, at the time the registration was issued. In a
hearing on the Petition for Cancellation of the "Redskins" trademark, the
TTAB held, "the case will be determined by deciding whether, at the time
173. 15 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
174. This Article is not suggesting that examiners perform the impossible task of
determining whether a mark may disparage some group in the future when there is
no indication of any current disparagement.
175. Evidence of disparagement after issuance of the registration should only be
offered to prove that the mark may have disparaged the group when it was regis-
tered. This would prevent a group that comes into being after the registration of a
mark from petitioning to cancel a mark on the basis that it now disparages them or
their beliefs. To cancel a mark because it disparages, the mark has to have the po-
tential to disparage the group at the date of its registration. If the group did not
exist at the time the mark was registered, it could not have disparaged them.
these registrations issued, the various marks were scandalous and/or
disparaging."' 6 The Board recognized that its holding regarding the ex-
istence of the grounds for cancellation at the time of the registration
might result in allowing deceptive or scandalous marks to maintain their
federal registration.'" The Board, however, concluded that this result
would have to be tolerated because "it appears that the framers of the
Act were attempting to strike a balance between the needs of the public
and the needs of trademark owners.""7?
The only existing test for disparagement emanated from Greyhound
Corp. v. Both Worlds Inc. " The TrAB held that a mark is disparaging if
it is shown: "(1) that the communication reasonably would be under-
stood as referring to plaintiffs; and (2) that the communication is dispar-
aging, that is, would be considered offensive or objectionable by a rea-
sonable person of ordinary sensibilities."'"
Despite the fact that this test was. developed in accordance with a
definition that was limited to the disparagement of property, it provides a
foundation for creating a test for racial disparagement. This Article
agrees with the first prong of the Greyhound disparagement inquiry that
the mark must reasonably be understood as referring to the plaintiff. If
the public does not perceive the mark as referring to the plaintiff, there
is no basis for claiming that the mark discredits or degrades the person
bringing the action.'1 This author sees no reason to treat the disparage-
ment of people any differently.
However, the second part of the Greyhound inquiry, which creates a
reasonable person test, is not well-suited to disparagement of per-
sons.'" Who should be the relevant public for determining whether a
trademark disparages a group or their beliefs: the trademark owner's
customers, the general public, or the members of the group that the
mark could disparage? Clearly, the trademark owner's customers would
not be an appropriate source for determining whether the mark is dispar-
aging to a group. If they believed that it was disparaging, presumably
they would not have bought the product."l Besides, courts have not
176. See Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
177. Id.
178. Consorzio del Prosciutto di Parma v. Parma Sausage Prods., Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1894, 1898-99 (T.T.A.B. 1992) (declining to cancel a mark even though it was
geographically deceptive at the time of trial because it was not geographically decep-
tive when registered).
179. 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1635 (T.T.A.B. 1988).
180. Id. at 1639.
181. Id.
182. See id.
183. Cf. In re Tinsletown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 863, 865 (T.T.A.B. 1951) (reject-
ing the trademark owner's argument that the question of whether a mark is scandal-
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limited the scandalousness inquiry to customers."s For a determination
of whether a mark is scandalous or immoral, the relevant public is a sub-
stantial composite of the general public."8 However, a substantial com-
posite of the general public is not appropriate for determining disparage-
ment of persons either because, unlike scandalousness, which is deter-
mined according to what society finds offensive, for disparagement, one
must look to whether a group (as opposed to society) will be offended
by a mark.86 While any reasonable person would suffice for a deter-
mination of whether a mark disparages another's property (commercial
disparagement), the test for whether a mark disparages persons in a
group should be determined from the standpoint of a reasonable person
in that group or a substantial composite of the group. This is especially
true when the inquiry concerns the disparagement of a racial minority.
C. The Constitutionality of Section 2(a)
"I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to death your right to
say it.". 7 The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech."86
1. First Amendment Protection for Trademarks
As commercial speech, a trademark is entitled to protection under the
First Amendment."6
ous should be determined by its "posh clientele").
184. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
185. See In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 485 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
186. This is true unless the court looks to a substantial composite of the group
possibly being disparaged. See Loving, supra note 148, at 38-39 (arguing that the
relevant public for a determination of whether Indian team names disparage Native
Americans should be a substantial composite of Native Americans, not the general
public).
187. Sambo's of Ohio, Inc. v. City Council of Toldeo, 466 F. Supp. 177, 180 (N.D.
Ohio 1979) (citations omitted).
188. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
189. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979) (holding that trade names are com-
mercial speech); see also Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 48 (2d Cir 1989);
Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 694 (6th Cir. 1981);
Sambo's of Ohio v. City Council of Toledo, 466 F. Supp. 177, 179 (N.D. Ohio 1979);
Harvey S. Perlman, The Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition: A Work in
Progress, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 461, 481 (1990) ("Trademark use fits clearly under Vir-
ginia Pharmacy as commercial speech . . . ."); Robert N. Kravitz, Trademarks,
Speech, and the Gay Olympics Case, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 604, 610 ("The use of a
It would appear that a company's trademark is the most important element of
commercial speech which is communicated to consumers. If commercial speech
is protected under the First Amendment to preserve a free market place of com-
mercial messages and to contribute to free competition, then a trademark is at the
core of the First Amendment protection .... All other elements of advertising
commercial speech revolve around, relate to and are symbolized by the trade-
mark."
Congress did not consider the relevance of the First Amendment when it
enacted Section 2(a). This is apparent because the Lanham Act was pro-
mulgated long before First Amendment protections were extended to
commercial speech. 9'
Trademark case law has, thus far, virtually ignored the possible con-
flict between the content-based restrictions contained in section 2(a) and
the United States Constitution. Only one court has addressed the con-
stitutionality of section 2(a), and it concluded, without any analysis, that
First Amendment rights were not at issue because the trademark owner
was not denied the right to use the mark, but merely denied the benefits
afforded by federal registration."n However, a determination that sec-
trademark in business is commercial speech."). Commercial speech is defined as
speech that proposes a commercial transaction. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976); Posadas de P.R.
Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986). A trademark clearly falls within the
definition of commercial speech. Friedman, 440 U.S. at 11. However, courts have
decided that commercial speech is entitled to a more limited form of First Amend-
ment protection. See infra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
190. J. Thomas McCarthy, Compulsory Licensing of a Trademark: Remedy or Pen-
alty, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 197, 234 (1977).
191. Prior to 1976, commercial speech was beyond the scope of the First Amend-
ment. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 388 (1973); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 64243 (1951); Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). Section 2(a) was enacted in 1946, years before
first amendment protections were extended to commercial speech in 1976. See gener-
ally Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc. 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
192. In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981). Even the attorney for the
Native Americans, who filed the Petition for Cancellation of the "Redskins" trade-
mark, concedes that the McGinley court's treatment of the first amendment question
was without merit:
In the McGinley decision, the CCPA, held that a trademark applicant's "First
Amendment rights would riot be abridged by the [PTOJ refusal to register his
mark." In reaching this conclusion, however, the court failed to articulate
much support for it. Conspicuously absent from its opinion was any discus-
sion of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, or commercial speech balanc-
ing principles. Moreover, the court seemed to gloss over a difficult constitu-
tional question when it suggested that First Amendment interests are not
implicated by Section 2(a) because "the PTO's refusal to register [applicant's]
mark does not affect his right to use it." . . . Although in McGinley the
CCPA purported to disperse the constitutional cloud hovering over Section
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tion 2(a) does not prohibit use, does not end the First Amendment inqui-
ry.
2. The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
While it is true that a denial of registration does not prevent the trade-
mark owner from continuing to use his trademark in conjunction with
his products," it does deny the trademark owner the benefits afforded
by federal registration."° Denial of registration will certainly act as an
economic deterrent and discourage use of the trademark. "[T]he fact that
no direct restraint or punishment is imposed upon speech or assembly
does not determine the free speech question. Under some circumstances,
indirect 'discouragements' undoubtedly have the same coercive effects
upon the exercise of the First Amendment rights as imprisonment, fines,
injunctions or taxes."'95 In this regard, the Supreme Court has stated:
To deny... [a benefit] to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in
effect to penalize them for speech. Its deterrent effect is the same as if the State
were to fine them for speech... [denying a benefit] for engaging in certain
speech necessarily will have the effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from
the proscribed speech.'
The Supreme Court has held that the government cannot condition ac-
cess to a benefit on the waiver of a constitutionally protected right under
the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine.1
97
2(a), it did so without a reasoned and well-articulated analysis of the difficult
underlying issues.
Stephen R. Baird, Moral Intervention in the Trademark Arena: Banning the Registra-
tion of Scandalous and Immoral Trademarks, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 661, 685-86 (1993)
(citations omitted).
193. See McGinley, 660 F.2d at 484, 486 n.12; Holiday Inn v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 534
F.2d 312, 319 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
194. McGinley, 660 F.2d at 486 n.12 ("[Tihere is no prohibition of appellant's use of
his mark . . . . [wihat is denied are the benefits provided by the Lanham Act which
enhance the value of the mark."). Federal registration provides a mark's owner with
benefits not available at common law or through state registration. See supra notes
72-81 and accompanying text.
195. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950).
196. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1958).
197. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 399401 (1984); Regan
v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983) ("The government may not
deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right."); Thomas v.
Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717 (1981) (declaring
that the state may not make benefits contingent on the denial of a constitutional
right); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
[Tihis court has made clear that even though a person has no 'right' to a valuable
government benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for
any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may
not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on the basis that it infringes his
constitutionally protected interests--especially his interest in the freedom of
speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his
constitutionally protected... [rights], his exercise of those freedoms would in
effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to 'produce a
result which [it] could not command directly.""
Since Section 2(a) contains a content-based restriction that conditions
the benefits accorded by federal registration upon a finding that the
trademark is not immoral, scandalous, or disparaging, it abridges the
trademark owner's First Amendment rights. The government is, in effect,
attempting to suppress speech through the denial of trademark registra-
tion.' m
3. The Central Hudson Analysis for Determining Whether
Section 2(a) is an Unconstitutional Regulation of
Commercial Speech
It is beyond dispute that the First Amendment protects commercial
speech.' However, there are limits to First Amendment protection
when the expression at issue is commercial speech."° "[Ojur decisions
have recognized 'the 'common-sense' distinction between speech pro-
posing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally
subject to government regulation and other varieties of speech.' Thus, we
have held that the Constitution accords less protection to commercial
627 n.6 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (stating that denial of
government benefits "effectively penalizes the free exercise of ... constitutional liber-
ties"); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1958); see also Blackburn v. Snow,
771 F.2d 556, 568 (lst Cir. 1985) ("[G]overnment may not condition access to even a
gratuitous benefit or privilege it bestows upon the sacrifice of a constitutional
right."); Sambo's Restaurants, Inc., v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 694-95 (6th
Cir. 1980) (holding that government cannot condition grant of building permits on
applicant's agreement to refrain from using a racially offensive name in advertise-
ments); Sambo's of Ohio v. City Council, 466 F. Supp. 177, 179 (N.D. Ohio 1979) ("It
is clear that the defendants' actions in undertaking to prevent the plaintiffs from the
use of their trade name 'Sambo's' is an unconstitutional deprivation of the First
Amendment right of free speech."); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions,
102 HARv. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989).
198. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (citations omitted).
199. The purpose of § 2(a) is to suppress and discourage speech which is offensive.
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
200. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, U.S. (1981).
201. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 566
(1980).
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speech than to other constitutionally safeguarded forms of expres-
sion." ' To determine whether government regulation of commercial
speech is an unwarranted violation of the First Amendment, courts look
to the four part test established by the Supreme Court in Central Hud-
son Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.' The court
must first decide if the speech is within the bounds of the law and not
misleading."u The First Amendment does not apply to commercial
speech that is false, deceptive, fraudulent or misleading' or commer-
cial speech that proposes an illegal transaction.' Thus, the government
is free to regulate these forms of commercial speech. It is clear that the
portion of Section 2(a) that applies to the prohibition of deceptive trade-
marks would constitute legitimate government regulation, not subject to
the First Amendment balancing principles. However, immoral, scandalous
or disparaging marks are neither misleading nor fraudulent, and,
therefore, the restraints on these marks do not fall outside the scope of
First Amendment inquiries.
The second prong of the Central Hudson analysis is that the asserted
government interest must be substantial. 7 Third, the regulation must
directly advance the asserted government interest.' Fourth, the regula-
tion cannot be broader than necessary to meet that interest.' "The last
two steps of the Central Hudson analysis basically involve a consider-
ation of the 'fit' between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to
accomplish those ends."" ' Therefore, to determine whether government
regulation of immoral, scandalous and disparaging trademarks is a viola-
tion of the trademark owner's First Amendment rights, a court must
weigh the latter three requirements of the Central Hudson test.
202. Bolger v. Young's Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983) (quoting Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 446, 455-56 (1978)) (citations omitted).
203. 447 U.S. at 556.
204. Id.
205. See Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986); Zauderer
v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1986); Central Hudson, 447 U.S.
at 563; Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. 447, 462 (1978).
206. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
207. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986).
Proponents of the constitutionality of Section 2(a) could claim that
there are a number of possible government interests supporting the deni-
al of registration of scandalous, immoral or disparaging trademarks.
First, the regulation may avoid the appearance that the government is
giving its stamp of approval to such trademark. Second, the regulation
exists to regulate morality and to prevent or discourage the dissemina-
tion of scandalous, immoral or disparaging matter to the public. This
rationale may be justified as to the government's interest in protecting
the health and welfare of its citizens. Third, the regulation may exist to
avoid using government funds to support immoral, scandalous and dis-
paraging trademarks. This Article addresses each substantive interest
individually and the application of the third and fourth elements of the
Central Hudson analysis to these asserted government interests.
While the government may have a legitimate interest in refusing to
endorse a scandalous, immoral or disparaging trademark, the regulation
at issue does not advance that interest. In a 1993 hearing, the TTAB de-
fiitively stated that issuance of a trademark registration does not
amount to a government endorsement of the trademark."'
In this case, as in others where the issue has been whether a mark is scandalous,
we have detected an undercurrent of concern that the issuance of a trademark
registration for the applicant's mark amounts to the awarding of the U.S.
Government's 'imprimatur' to the mark. Such a notion is, of course, errone-
ous .... Just as the issuance of a trademark registration by the office does not
amount to a government endorsement of the quality of the goods to which the
mark is applied, the act of registration is not a government imprimatur or pro-
nouncement that the mark is a 'good' one in an aesthetic, or any analogous,
sense. " '
Since awarding registration does not amount to government endorsement
of the mark, withholding registration does not serve the function of re-
moving the government's imprimatur on scandalous, immoral or dispar-
aging marks.
Undoubtedly, the second interest concerning the protection of the
health and welfare of the citizens constitutes a substantial government
interest.2"3 However, there is no evidence that denying registration for
immoral, scandalous, or disparaging trademarks will protect health and
welfare. At most, these trademarks will offend. The fact that some mem-
211. In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216, 1219 (T.T.A.B.
1993). But see In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (registering a trade-
mark would be "stamping the government's imprimatur" on the mark); In re
McGinley, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 753 (1979) (stating that federal registration conveys the
government's "implied approval" of the mark).
212. Old Glory, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219 n.3.
213. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341 (holding that a ban on advertising of casino gam-
bling aimed at Puerto Rican residents is a constitutional regulation because of the
legislature's substantial interest in protecting the health and welfare of its citizens).
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bers of society, or even a majority of society, might be offended by the
trademark is not sufficient to deny otherwise protected First Amendment
rights. 14 The government's interest in discouraging offensive speech is
not a substantial interest that warrants suppression of constitutional
rights.
216
A related argument is that racially disparaging trademarks may frus-
trate the government's substantial interest in promoting racial harmony
and equality. While promoting racial harmony is a substantial government
interest,1 ' there is no evidence that Section 2(a) accomplishes this goal.
One would have to proffer, at a minimum, tangible evidence of disrup-
tion caused by the use of immoral, scandalous or disparaging marks. In
Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor,"7 where both parties
stipulated that the trade name "Sambo's" was offensive to black people
and "conveys to some citizens a pernicious racial stereotype of blacks as
inferior," the court held that the trade name was a protected First
Amendment expression that could not be regulated.2"' The court rea-
soned that mere stipulation that the mark affects racial harmony is insuf-
ficient evidence to surmount First Amendment scrutiny.2"9
Even if it could be argued that the portion of Section 2(a) that restricts
the registration of disparaging trademarks would be a legitimate means
of accomplishing the governmental interest of racial harmony, Section
2(a) would still be overbroad and, therefore, unconstitutional. "The over-
breadth doctrine invalidates sweeping legislation that outlaws constitu-
214. See Virginia Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 765 (stating that commercial speech
cannot be denied first amendment protection just because the speech may be "taste-
less and excessive"); Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977) ("[alt
least where obscenity is not involved, we have consistently held that the fact that
protected [commercial] speech may be offensive to some does not justify its suppres-
sion."); Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 694 (6th Cir.
1981) ("[w]e must also reject the proposition that otherwise protected commercial
speech is stripped of that protection because of its ancillary offensiveness."); cf.
Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 149 (1946) (denying second class mailing
privileges, a form of government subsidy, to a magazine because it is "indecent" or
"morally improper" violates the first amendment).
215. Sambo's of Ohio v. City Council, 466 F. Supp. 177, 180 (N.D. Ohio 1979). "It
would be selling our birthright for a mess of pottage to hold that because language
is offensive and distasteful even to a majority of the public, a legislative body may
forbid its use." Id.
216. See id. at 695.
217. 663 F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1980).
218. Id. at 694-95.
219. Id.
tionally protected rights of free speech, press, or assembly along with
allowable proscriptions."" ° Furthermore, the fourth element of the Cen-
tral Hudson analysis specifically prohibits overbroad regulations of con-
stitutionally protected speech." Hence, even if one could successfully
argue that prohibiting the registration of disparaging trademarks would
achieve the governmental objectives of racial harmony and equality, Sec-
tion 2(a) is still unconstitutionally overbroad because the remaining por-
tion of Section 2(a), which pertains to immoral or scandalous marks,
would not be a legitimate restriction of constitutionally protected rights.
The third substantial interest which may be asserted for upholding the
restriction on speech contained in Section 2(a) is the interest in limiting
the expenditure of government funds. The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals claimed, "[w]e do not see [the denial of registration for scandal-
ous trademarks] as an attempt to legislate morality, but, rather, a judge-
ment by the Congress that such marks not occupy the time, services, and
use of funds of the federal government."' However, since withholding
registration no longer saves Congress time or money, Section 2(a) is not
well-suited to achieve this government interest. This is because congres-
sional funding for the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) operations has
switched from public funding to user funding, whereby public funds are
not longer expended to register a mark.' Thus, the PTO's operations
are now supported entirely by the processing fees paid by the appli-
cants.' "Under these circumstances, it is the PTO's opposition to a
mark, rather than its approval, that is more likely to cause the expendi-
ture of federal funds and, for that reason, Section 2(a) is inappropriately
considered a presumptively valid decision not to fund."225 It also seems
obvious that more time would be expended refusing registration than it
220. Thomas H. Moore, Note, R.AV. v. City of St. Paul: A Curious Way to Protect
Free Speech, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1251, 1258 n.35 (1993); see also Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. 518, 526-28 (1972) (holding that breach of the peace statute which outlawed
protected speech as well as fighting words were overbroad).
221. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 566,
566 (1980) (stating that the regulation cannot be more extensive than necessary to
meet the government's interest).
222. In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 486 (C.C.P.A. 1981). How can the CCPA claim
that § 2(a) is not an attempt to legislate morality when the legislative history indi-
cates that the purpose of § 2(a) was to discourage the use of scandalous, immoral
and disparaging trademarks? See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
223. See 56 Fed. Reg. 65147 (1991); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 10101, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 1388; Theodore H. Davis,
Jr., Registration of Scandalous and Disparaging Matter Under Section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act: Can One Man's Vulgarity Be Anothers Registered Trademark?, 54 OHIO
ST. L. J. 331 (1993); UTSA Holds Annual Meeting: Trademark Review Commission
Releases Report, 34 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 56, 58 (1988).
224. See Davis, supra note 223, at 367.
225. Id. at 368.
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would in granting registration due to the applicant's right to appeal. For
these reasons, the decision not to register immoral, scandalous, or dis-
paraging marks is not a valid means of limiting the expenditure of gov-
ernment resources.
For the foregoing reasons, this Article argues that Section 2(a) is an
unconstitutional restriction of protected First Amendment expression.
One commentator has argued that Section 2(a) could still be upheld as a
constitutional restriction of First Amendment speech if the courts were
to limit the application of the terms "immoral" and "scandalous" to only
the registration of obscene expression and the term "disparaging" to the
restriction of "fighting words."' 6 Thus, since the first amendment pro-
tection does not apply to "fighting words""7 or obscenity,'s if courts
were to interpret 2(a) in this manner, Section 2(a) would not violate any
first amendment rights. However, such an interpretation would ignore a
basic principle of statutory interpretation - that every word in a statute
has a meaning.m Congress did not restrict the registration of "obscene"
trademarks; it restricted immoral, scandalous or disparaging trademarks.
In fact, one court specifically found that the term "scandalous" does not
mean "obscene."'
V. THE PETITION TO CANCEL THE "REDSKINS" TRADEMARK
A. The Redskins Case
On March 11, 1994, a group of Native Americans filed a Petition for
Cancellation of the "Redskins" trademark.' Although this was not the
226. Id. at 373. At least one judge has agreed that only marks which are either ob-
scene or profane should be refused registration as scandalous. See In re Mavey Me-
dia Group Ltd., 1993 TTAB LEXIS 25, *26 (T.T.A.B. 1993) (Simms, member, dissent-
ing), vacated, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 22772 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 23, 1994).
227. See Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (stating that the
government may prevent and punish the use of speech that is likely to incite an
immediate breach of the peace).
228. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (declaring that the government
may freely regulate obscene speech because it is not protected by the First
Amendment).
229. See United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
230. See McGinley, 660 F.2d at 485 ("Section 2(a) does not use the term 'obscene,'
but it uses the term 'scandalous.'").
231. See Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828 (T.T.A.B. 1994). The
attorney for the Native Americans, Stephen Baird, is representing the Petitioners on a
pro bono basis. Grow, supra note 45, at 3B; Shapiro, supra note 44, at C1.
first cancellation proceeding brought under Section 2(a), 2 it was the
first .ever brought under the "disparagement" prohibition of Section
2(a).' The Petition claimed that the trademark was at the time of regis-
tration, and continues to be, "a pejorative, derogatory, denigrating, offen-
sive, scandalous, contemptuous, disreputable, disparaging and racist
designation for Native American person."' The trademark owner re-
sponded by asserting eleven affirmative defenses in his answer, which
included: Petitioners' lack of standing; equitable estoppel; laches; the
mark's attainment of a strong secondary meaning; lack of damage suf-
fered by Petitioners due to the registration; the Petitioners' claims are
barred because they are based upon Section 2(a) which unconstitution-
ally abridges the Respondent's freedom of speech; Petitioners' claims are
barred because Section 2(a) is unconstitutionally overbroad; Petitioners'
claims are barred because Section 2(a) is unconstitutionally void for
vagueness; the "Redskins" mark cannot disparage the Petitioners because
it cannot be reasonably understood as referring to them or to any group
or organization to which they belong."
This Article will summarize the major affirmative defenses and discuss
their merit, as well as the TTAB's decision to strike nine of the eleven
defenses. The Board upheld the defense which claimed that the mark
does not disparage the Petitioners because it does not refer to them, and
the secondary meaning defense. However, the Board interpreted the sec-
ondary meaning defense as an elaboration of Respondent's defense deny-
ing the allegations in the Petition and not as a claim that the mark can
withstand Section 2(a) scrutiny because it had acquired secondary
meaning.' In fact, the Board held that secondary meaning is not a de-
fense to claims that the mark is disparaging, stating that "a trademark or
service mark may be distinctive and, at the same time, disparaging and/or
scandalous."237
1. Standing and Damages
Initially, Respondent challenged Petitioner's standing to bring the can-
232. See Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala v. BAMA-Werke Curt Baumann, 231
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 408, 412, (T.T.A.B. 1986) (canceling a 31 year old trademark because
it falsely suggested a connection with the University of Alabama).
233. Harjo, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1828. Petitioners also asserted that the
trademark is scandalous and immoral as well, but this Article will limit its analysis to
whether the mark is disparaging. In so doing, this Article shall address whether the
mark brings the Native Americans into contempt and disrepute.
234. See id. at 1829.
235. See generally Answer to Petition for Cancellation, Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc.,
30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
236. Harjo, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
237. Id.
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cellation proceeding, and claimed that Petitioners failed to meet their
burden of proving damages.' To meet the threshold inquiry of
standing, petitioners must have a "personal interest" in the outcome of
the proceeding, and they cannot be "mere intermeddlers."239 The
Lanham Act's cancellation provision provides that "any person who be-
lieves that he is or will be damaged by the registration of a mark" may
file a petition for cancellation.' "The requirements for standing in a
petition to cancel based on disparagement of beliefs are not very rigor-
ous."" There is no requirement that petitioners prove damage" or
any other direct economic or commercial interest to establish stand-
ing.2 43 In a proceeding brought under Section 2(a), the TTAB held that
an assertion that a party is offended by a trademark and that they be-
lieve that it is scandalous, immoral and disparaging as applied to them, is
sufficient to establish standing.244 Consistent with these decisions, the
TTAB held that the Native Americans had the requisite standing to bring
a cancellation proceeding against the owners of the "Redskins" trade-
238. See Answer to Petition at 2, Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1828 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
239. See International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindegurg & Co,, 727 F.2d 1087,
1092 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Upton Indus., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 1028-
29 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
240. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1988). Standing requirements to bring a cancellation proceed-
ing or to bring an opposition are identical. See Lipton, 670 F.2d at 1028-30; Golden
Gate Salami Co. v. Gulf States Paper Corp., 332 F.2d 184 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
241. Abraham's Seed v. John One Ten, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1230, 1232-33 (T.T.A.B.
1986).
242. See Books on Tape, Inc. v. Booktape Corp., 836 F.2d 519 (Fed. Cir. 1987);
Job's Daughters, 727 F.2d at 1092; Rosso & Mastracco, Inc. v. Giant Food, Inc., 720
F.2d 1263, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Selva & Sons, Inc. v. Nina Footwear, Inc., 705 F.2d
1316, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("Historically, there has been much confusion in the
cases between standing and damage which recent decisions and opinions have, hope-
fully, been straightening out. The conclusion is simple-pleading and proof of damage
are not necessary to establish standing."); 1 JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION
AND PRACTICE § 3.05[3][a], at 3-158 (1978); 2 J. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 20.13[11], at 20-78 (3d ed. 1992) ("As in opposition pro-
ceedings, a Petitioner for cancellation need not prove actual damage."); cf. Bromberg
v. Carmel Self Serv., Inc., 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 176, 179 (T.T.A.B. 1978) ("Section 13
[on opposition proceedings] requires only that an opposer believe that it would be
damaged.").
243. Bromberg, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 177.
244. Id. However, one commentator has argued that the standing test established by
the PTO is inconsistent with constitutional standing requirements of article III. See
Davis, supra note 223, at 385.
mark. " ' The petitioners are Native Americans asserting that the
trademark "Redskins" is a derogatory term that refers to Native Ameri-
cans and brings them into contempt and disrepute. 6 They have also
asserted that the mark offends them as Native Americans. 7
2. Equitable Defenses
Next, Respondents asserted the affirmative defenses of laches2 and
equitable estoppel.24 Respondents claimed that Petitioners had known
about the registered trademarks for years, and that cancellation of these
marks, in which Respondents have invested significant time and money,
would prejudice and harm respondents.' ° Petitioners argued that the
plain language of the Lanham Act-that a petition for cancellation can be
filed "at any time"-precludes the laches defense in any cancellation pro-
ceeding arising under sections (a), (b) or (c)."' "[I]t is within the public
interest to have registrations which are void ab initio stricken from the
register and that this interest or concern cannot be voided by the inac-
tion of any single person or concern, no matter how long the delay per-
sists."' Contrary to the clear language of the statute, the Board has al-
lowed the defense of laches in a cancellation proceeding brought under
245. Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828, 1830 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. 15 U.S.C. § 1069 (1988). The defense of laches may be invoked to bar an ac-
tion when petitioners have unreasonably and inexcusably delayed in exercising their
rights and where such delay would result in material prejudice to the trademark
owner. See Purex Corp. v. Maryland Paper Prods. Co., 287 F.2d 186, 187 (C.C.A.P.
1961).
249. 15 U.S.C. § 1069 (1988). The defense of equitable estoppel may be invoked to
bar an action when the respondents relied on the petitioner's action (or in this case
inaction) to their detriment. Under this theory, if the respondents would suffer injury
because the petitioners are allowed to repudiate their conduct, then the petitioners
are estopped from exercising their right. See Patton v. Bearden, 8 F.3d 343, 346 (6th
Cir. 1993).
250. See Answer to Petition for Cancellation at 2, Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
251. See Petitioner's Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses at 7, Harjo v. Pro Foot-
ball, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828 (T.T.A.B. 1994); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c)
(1988); National Serv. Indus. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 68, 70 (T.T.A.B.
1967) (holding that the defense of laches is inapplicable in an cancellation proceeding
where the mark contrary to any of the provisions of subsections 2(a), (b) or (c)).
252. American Velcro, Inc. v. Charles Mayer Studios, Inc., 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 149,
153 n.5 (T.T.A.B. 1973); see also Wandel Mach. Co. v. Altoona Fain Inc., 133 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 410, 410-11 (T.T.A.B. 1962) (determining that "laches is not available as a de-
fense in an action to remove a registration which was clearly void ab initio"). A
trademark is void ab initio if it should never have been granted because it was
contrary to the law or public policy.
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section 2(a).' 3 In that case, the Board held that the defenses of laches
and estoppel should be allowed unless there is an overriding public poli-
cy interest in precluding the equitable defenses. In the case at hand, the
TrAB avoided the conflict between the statutory language and its prior
decision by holding that the defenses of laches and estoppel are not
allowed because of an overriding public policy interest in preventing
disparaging marks that "hold a substantial segment of the population up
to public ridicule" from receiving the benefits of federal registration.' 4
253. See Treadwell's Drifters Inc. v. Marshak, 18 US.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1318 (T.T.A.B.
1990) (allowing equitable defenses of laches and estoppel in a cancellation proceeding
brought under § 2(a) which claimed that the trademark falsely suggested a connec-
tion with the opposer).
254. Harjo, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831. The Board claimed, however, that it was
not holding that laches and estoppel would be barred in all disparagement cases. Id.
While it is beyond the scope of this Article, the Lanham Act seems to be internally
inconsistent in the application of equitable defenses to bar cancellation proceedings
brought under § 14(3). Section 14(3) clearly states that a cancellation proceeding may
be brought "at any time" for the limited grounds enumerated in that section. See 15
U.S.C. § 1064 (1988) (emphasis added). However, § 19 states: "In a// inter partes pro-
ceedings equitable principles of laches, estoppel and acquiescence, where applicable
may be considered and applied." 15 U.S.C. § 1069 (1988) (emphasis added). Courts
have responded to this inconsistency by determining whether an overriding public
policy exists to preclude the application of the equitable defenses. See TreadweUs
Drfters, U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1320-21 (stating that equitable defenses are available
against the claim that respondent's mark falsely suggests a connection with petitioner
because the rights asserted are personal in nature and there is no overriding public
policy interest in preventing their application); TBC Corp. v. Grand Prix Ltd., 12
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1311, 1313 (T.T.A.B. 1989) (holding that equitable defenses are not
available in a proceeding based on descriptiveness, fraud or abandonment because of
the public interest in precluding the registration of these marks); Bausch & Lomb
Inc. v. Leupold & Stevens, Inc., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1497, 1499 (T.T.A.B. 1986) (hold-
ing that equitable defenses are inapplicable where an opposition is based on a claim
that the mark is merely descriptive or, in cases of fraud, because it is within the
public interest to preclude such registrations); Southwire Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp., 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 566, 573 (T.T.A.B. 1977) ("[I]t is settled that the
equitable defenses of laches and estoppel are not available in a proceeding...
[where the] plaintiff is asserting in essence that the mark in question is devoid of the
capacity to perform a trademark function. The theory underlying this principle as
expounded in these cases is that it is within the public interest to preclude registra-
tion of merely descriptive designations, to cancel registrations which are void ab
initio because of this disability of the registered mark as of the time the application
was filed, and to cancel those registrations where the registered marks have, since
the time of registration, become terms of art or common description; and that this
interest or concern cannot be waived by the inaction of any single person or con-
cern, no matter how long the delay persists.") (citations omitted).
3. Constitutional Challenges
Respondents also raised a number of challenges to the constitutional-
ity of section 2(a) both on its face and in its application.' They
claimed that Section 2(a) is unconstitutional because it abridges their
freedom of speech, is unconstitutionally overbroad and is void for vague-
ness. However, the TTAB never reached the merit of these challenges
because it determined, correctly, that such findings were beyond its au-
thority as an administrative tribunal.' Since the ITAB is an administra-
tive agency created by Congress, it is bound by congressional enact-
ments, and it does not have the authority to hold such enactments un-
constitutional.u7 "It goes without saying that the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board, being a creature of the Congress, is bound to apply the
statute as it was enacted .... This limitation on our power applies even
to constitutionality challenges."'
Although the TTAB is unable to decide issues of constitutionality,
Respondents, by raising those issues, have preserved them for appeal. If
this case is appealed to the United States Court for the Federal Circuit,
Respondents will be able to challenge the constitutionality of section
2(a). If this opportunity does not present itself, the court must apply the
Central Hudson balancing principles, as this Article has done above, to
determine if the government's regulation of speech in section 2(a) vio-
lates the First Amendment. Blanket reliance on the CCPA decision in
McGinley would be inappropriate since that court glossed over the diffi-
cult constitutional challenges in a cursory manner, without articulating
any analysis for its decision. In addition, there have been substantial
changes in the manner in which the PTO is funded following the
McGinley decision, which makes the court's analysis inapplicable to the
present situation. This Article concludes that, after applying the First
Amendment balancing principles to section 2(a), section 2(a) is unconsti-
tutional because it abridges the trademark owners' freedom of
speech.' This Article also finds that section 2(a) is unconstitutionally
overbroad.'
Finally, Respondents claim, and this Article agrees, that section 2(a) is
unconstitutionally void for vagueness.26 ' The respondents assert that the
255. See Answer to Petition for Cancellation at 3-4, Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
256. See Harjo, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA).
257. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974); Panola Land Buyers Ass'n v.
Shuman, 762 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1985).
258. In re ETA Sys. Inc., 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1367, 1370 n.4 (T.T.A.B. 1987).
259. See supra notes 201-26 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
261. See Respondent's Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion to Strike
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terms "scandalous" and "disparage" within section 2(a) are imprecise and
fail to provide a clearly defined standard for those who must abide by
them and for those who must enforce them.' The McGinley court's
treatment of the void for vagueness question, like its treatment of the
first amendment issues, provides a shallow analysis of the requisite level
of precision required to withstand a due process challenge.2' The
McGinley court, without ever reaching the standards established by the
Supreme Court for determining vagueness, held that section 2(a)'s high
degree of subjectiveness is not a sufficient basis for claiming that the
terms are unconstitutionally void for vagueness.2'
The void for vagueness doctrine emanates from the Fifth Amendment's
requirement that persons receive due process of law. While federal stat-
utes are entitled to a strong presumption of validity,' it is also true
that statutes that proscribe free speech receive the strictest scrutiny for
vagueness.2"6 "The Court relaxes the requirement in first amendment
cases in order to invalidate statutes that would have a chilling effect by
discouraging persons from engaging in conduct that is protected by the
First Amendment." 7
Due process requires that statutes provide sufficient guidance to those
who must obey the law, enforce the law and interpret the law.' Sec-
tion 2(a) would be void for vagueness if it fails to give the public fair
guidance as to which trademarks are prohibited,2" fails to provide suffi-
Affirmative Defenses at 17, Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828
(T.T.KB. 1994).
262. Id.
263. See In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
264. See id. at 484; cf. Warner-Hudnut, Inc. v. Wander Co., 280 F.2d 435, 436
(C.C.P.A. 1960) (noting that the fact that determinations of the likelihood of confusion
are often subjective does not affect the validity of the terms).
265. See United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963) (point-
ing out the "strong presumptive validity that attaches to an act of Congress").
266. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963); see also Christopher J. Moran,
Comment, Is the "Darting" in Danger? 'Void for Vagueness" - The Constitutionally.
of the RICO Pattern Requirement, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1697 (1991) (holding that where a
statute which is challenged as unconstitutionally vague, encroaches on first amend-
ment rights, the defendant need not even prove that the statute is impermissibly
vague as applied to his conduct).
267. Moran, supra note 266, at 1704 (citing Greyned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 108-09 (1972)).
268. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983); see generally Moran, su-
pra note 266.
269. If a statute "either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
cient guidance to those charged with enforcing the statute (here, the
PTO),"O or fails to provide sufficient guidance to the judges charged
with interpreting it. 7'
Respondents argue, and this Article agrees, that the terms "scandalous"
and "disparage" do not provide the public with adequate notice of which
marks are prohibited from registration, nor do they provide the PTO with
enough guidance to enforce the statute. Like the terms "scandalous" and
"immoral," neither the Lanham Act nor its legislative history define the
term "disparage." In fact, the Assistant Commissioner of Patents, Leslie
Frazer, expressed the concern in the Lanham Act Hearings that the term
"disparage" will be difficult to apply because a determination of dispar-
agement is completely subjective.72
Mr. Frazer. I would like to make this suggestion with respect to the world 'dis-
parage.' I am afraid that the use of the word in this connection is going to cause a
great deal of difficulty in the Patent Office, because, as someone else has suggest-
ed, that is a very comprehensive word, and it is always going to be just a matter
of personal opinion of the individual parties as to whether they think it is dispar-
aging. I would like very much to see some other word substituted for that word
'disparage.'
Mr. Lanham. That seems to me, in the light of administration, to be a very perti-
nent suggestion, and if you gentlemen can clarify that with verbiage you suggest it
would be helpful.'"'
Tribunals have agreed that determining whether a mark is disparaging is
highly subjective. 7 ' The 'ITAB, which is charged with enforcing the
Lanham Act, has held that the terms "scandalous" and "disparage" are
"somewhat vague. " 5 These terms render Section 2(a) void for vague-
ness because they fail to provide the public and the PTO with sufficient
guidance as to which trademarks should be prohibited registration. These
vague and highly subjective tests do not provide meaningful guidance for
the PTO. As a result, the law is inconsistently and sometimes erroneous-
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application," then it is unconstitutionally void for vagueness. Conally v. General
Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (stating that a statute which required contractors
to pay workmen "current rate of per diem in the locality where the work is per-
formed" is void for vagueness).
270. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58.
271. See Greyned, 408 U.S. at 108-09.
272. Hearings, supra note 98, at 18 (statement of Leslie Frazer).
273. Id.
274. See, e.g., In re In Over Our Heads, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1653, 1654
(T.T.A.B. 1990); cf. In re Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1470, 1471 (T.T.A.B. 1988)
(noting that the test for determining whether a mark is scandalous is highly subjec-
tive).
275. See In Over Our Heads, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654 ("[T]he guidelines for
determining whether a mark is scandalous or disparaging are 'somewhat vague.'"
(quoting Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471)).
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ly applied and, at times, the distinctions made by the PTO, between
trademarks that are scandalous or disparaging and trademarks which are
not, appear indefensible. However, a federal court could avoid a finding
that section 2(a) is unconstitutionally vague by narrowing its interpreta-
tion of the expression to be restricted.27
4. "Redskins" Mark is Not Disparaging Because it Does Not Refer
to Petitioners
Finally, Respondent's had two affirmative defenses that were not
struck by the TTAB. Both defenses claim that the "Redskin" mark should
not be cancelled because it does not refer to Petitioners or to any groups
to which they belong and, thus, cannot be interpreted as either disparag-
ing or bringing Petitioners into contempt or disrepute.n Because most
of the affirmative defenses were struck down, the TTAB must now de-
cide the disparagement issue. Since a federally registered trademark has
a presumption of validity, Petitioners have the burden of proving dispar-
agement.
B. Applying the Disparagement Test to the "Redskins" Case
If Petitioners can prove that the "Redskins" trademark can reasonably
be understood to refer to them as Native Americans and that reasonable
Native Americans or a substantial composite of Native Americans could
have found the mark disparaging in 1967 when registration was issued,
then the "Redskins" trademark should be cancelled. Petitioners should be
able to satisfy the first element of the test easily since the "Redskins"
trademark is used in conjunction with a picture of an Indian. The second
element will require proof that the term "Redskin" was a derogatory and
disparaging reference to Native Americans when the trademark was reg-
istered and that the use of this term brought them into contempt and
disrepute. The term "Redskin" has been defined by Webster's Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary, as "American Indian-usu[ually] taken to be offen-
sive." 'n The term "Redskin" was a derogatory reference to Indians as
276. For example, use of the term "obscene" is not void for vagueness because the
Supreme Court limited its application to "materials depict[ing] or describ[ing] patently
offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating state law."
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973).
277. See Answer to Petition for Cancellation at 3-4, Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
278. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 987 (9th ed. 1990). The term
far back as 1699 when it was declared, "[yle firste Meeting House was
solid mayde to withstande ye wicked onsaults of ye Red Skins."" As
one author noted, "[tlo many Native Americans, redskin is as derogatory
as 'nigger' is for black Americans. " ' Petitioners should also be permit-
ted to offer contemporary proof that the mark is disparaging as evidence
that when registered the mark had the potential to disparage." There-
fore, if Petitioners can prove that the "Redskin" trademark is disparaging,
it will be cancelled.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article concludes that section 2(a) should not survive the consti-
tutional challenges because it violates the First Amendment, is
overbroad, and is void for vagueness. If section 2(a) does survive these
challenges, however, the "Redskins" mark should be cancelled because it
disparages Native Americans. This article has proposed a test for dispar-
agement: (1) whether the mark is reasonably understood as referring to
Native Americans; and (2) whether a reasonable Indian or a substantial
composite of Native Americans believe that the mark is disparaging to
Indians.'
Some trademark owners may fear that cancellation of the "Redskins"
mark will have a domino effect-that it will spur cancellation proceed-
ings against any trademark that any group finds mildly offensive. Further-
more, they may be concerned that cancellation of the "Redskins" mark
will encourage many to attempt to impose their notions of political cor-
rectness on society through cancellation proceedings. One commentator
has noted:
Possibilities for finding offense are endless. Surely the Giants offended everyone
who is pituitarily challenged. No devoted Catholic wants to watch the Saints or
Angels getting knocked about on the field. How do the Swedes feel when the
Native American skins stop the Vikings? Can a Southern team bear to lose to the
Yankees? And who do you think picked all that cotton in the Cotton Bowl?'
The University of Miami probably through it was free from controversy
when it adopted the nickname-the "Hurricanes." To the school's sur-
prise, it received complaints from people who claimed that the name is
"nigger" is defined by this same dictionary as "Negro-usu[ually] taken to be offen-
sive." Id. at 798.
279. Randy Furst, Indian Activists Seek to Have Redskins Stipped of U.S. Trade-
mark Protections, STAR TRIB., Sept. 11, 1992, at IA.
280. Loving, supra note 148, at 40 (quoting JAY CROAKLEY, SPORTS IN SOcIETY: ISSUES
AND CONTROVERSIES 206-07 (4th ed. 1990).
281. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 180-87 and accompanying text.
283. See Fields, supra note 29, at AS.
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offensive because of the devastation caused by Hurricane Andrew in
southern Florida.'
However, there is no reason for these trademark owners to be
alarmed. The disparagement test does not allow anyone who is mildly
offended by a particular trademark to petition for cancellation of the
mark. First, the party claiming disparagement must be a member of the
group to which the trademark is reasonably understood as applying and,
second, a substantial composite of that group or a reasonable member of
the group must find the mark disparaging.' This test prevents inter-
meddling groups from bringing unwarranted suits in an attempt to im-
pose their views of political correctness on society. For instance, while
Native Americans do find the "Fighting Illini" disparaging, the Irish do
not appear to find the "Fighting Irish" offensive, so the latter trademark
would not be subject to cancellation.'
If the TTAB does cancel the "Redskins" mark, it will lose the benefits
afforded by federal registration. 7 This leaves open the question of
whether the trademark could still receive common law protection.'
The first Restatement of Torts indicates that the common law will not
protect a trademark which is prohibited by legislative enactment or by
an otherwise defined public policy.' The Restatement's definition of
trademark explicitly excludes marks which are scandalous or contrary to
any defined public policy.' Since the Lanham Act has clearly prohibit-
ed the registration of scandalous and disparaging marks for public policy
reasons, these marks would, likewise, be unprotected by the Restate-
ment.
284. See Arnold, supra note 27, at 1; supra note 28 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 180-87 and accompanying text.
286. See Kelley, supra note 1, at El.
287. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
288. At least one case has held that if a mark is not entitled to federal registration
because it violates the content based bars to registration, public policy prevents it
from receiving protection at common law. See De Nobili v. Scanda, 198 F. 341, 346
(W.D. Pa. 1912) ("If it could not be registered as a trademark . . ; we see no reason
why it should be protected as a label."). While the law may not advocate that all
trademarks which are refused registration are likewise not entitled to protection at
common law, there is a public interest in discouraging the use of disparaging marks
which could justify denying this limited class of marks common law protection. One
commentator has argued that if a federal registration is cancelled because a mark is
disparaging, the common law should not protect the mark. See Loving, supra note
148, at 3.
289. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 715(d) (1938).
290. Id. § 726.
If the federal registration of the "Redskins" trademark is cancelled
because the mark disparages Native Americans, and the common law
denies protection to the mark despite its long use in commerce, then the
trademark owner would not be able to exclude others from adopting the
mark. This raises an interesting question: If canceling the federal registra-
tion of the "Redskins" mark ultimately means that others can adopt it,
why are the Native Americans pursuing this course of action? A commen-
tator has noted that, "I cannot condone the American Indian Movement's
effort to cancel the exclusive trademark of the Redskins. A likely conse-
quence would be that many high schools and colleges would 'honor' us
similarly and adopt that epithet as their mascot.""'
Finally, even if the Petition for Cancellation is granted, the team can
continue to use the REDSKINS mark. However, the Petitioners hope that
loss of federal registration will be a sufficient economic influence to per-
suade Jack Kent Cook to change the team's name.'
291. See Pensoneau, supra note 43, at 14A.
292. In 1991, the "Redskins" trademark owner earned over $1,000,000.00 from mer-
chandising licenses which allow others to make sports paraphernalia with the "Red-
skins" mark. See Furst, supra note 279, at lA. If the Native Americans win and the
"Redskins" trademark is cancelled, could the Indians file a class action tort suit for
defamation against the trademark owner? At least one commentator believes that they
could. See Loving, supra note 148, at 37-38 n.273. Defamation has been defined as
.words which tend to expose one to public hatred, shame ... contempt, ridi-
cule ...degradation or disgrace." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 773 n.17 (5th ed. 1984). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 546A cmt. a (1989) ("As a general rule no action lies for the publication
of defamatory words concerning a large group or class of persons.").




was granted federal registration
for use on canned fruits and vegetables
GOLD DUST
was granted federal registration
for use on washing powder
NICKELINE
was granted federal registration
for use on stove polish
The idea for use of the black twins
came from a cartoon which showed the twins
washing each other in a tub and the caption read,
"Warranted to wash clean and not fade."
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Appendix C
WASHINGTON
REDSKINS
WASHINGTON REDSKINS
CHICAGO BLACKHAWKS
ATLANTA BRAVES
CLEVELAND INDIANS
CHIEF WAHOO

